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"I WANT TO STOP THIS GUY!"*
SOME "TOUCHY" ISSUES ARISING FROM
MINNESOTA V. DICKERSON**
ROBERT FRASER MILLER***
I. INTRODUCTION
You have recently moved into a twelve-unit apartment building
located in a low-income urban community. Although you and your
neighbors are law-abiding citizens, the community is rife with crime. In
the past, the police have executed warrants to search for narcotics and
weapons in your building and in other buildings nearby. One evening,
you decide to visit a friend who lives a few blocks away. After descend-
ing the front staircase of your building, you suddenly realize that a faster
route to your friend's house is to cut through an alley located behind the
building. As you abruptly change course, you notice a police car
approaching your building. A few moments later, you see the police car
again, in the alley, this time with lights flashing. Your heart begins
pounding and you feel yourself sweating with apprehension as the
officers exit their car and approach you. They order you to place your
hands on the car and immediately frisk you. The frisking officer
proceeds by feeling his way along your body, moving his hands from
your neck and collar to your arms, your chest, and eventually to your
most private areas. His hand stops atop your thin jacket pocket, which
contains a small gum-ball wrapped in cellophane and a wad of folded
dollar bills. The officer reaches into your pocket and seizes these .items.
The officer then handcuffs you, recites your "Miranda" rights, and
shoves you into the car. After waiting endless hours in the "lockup"
See Transcript of Proceedings at 16, 23, 25, and 35, State v. Dickerson, No. 89067687 (Feb. 20,
1990) [hereinafter transcript]. The police report of one officer investigating the Dickerson case
indicated "'I told my partner that I wanted to stop this party' after the officers saw Timothy
Dickerson walk into an alley. Transcript at 25 (defense attorney Mary Moriarty quoting from
paragraph three of Officer Bruce Johnson's report). Throughout the proceedings, the prosecution and
defense attorneys paraphrased the officer's statement alternatively as "I want to stop this guy,"
Transcript at 23, or "I want to stop that guy." Transcript at 16, 35.
** 113 S.Ct. 2130 (1993).
* B.A. 1989, Rutgers College; J.D. 1992, Rutgers School of Law-Camden; Admitted to
practice in New Jersey and Pennsylvania.
I want to thank Stanislaw Pomorski, Distinguished Professor of Law from the Rutgers School of
Law-Camden, and Peter W. Gorman, Assistant Public Defender of Hennepin County, Minnesota, for
their comments on an early draft of this article. I also want to thank Mr. Gorman, Michael 0.
Freeman of the Hennepin County Attorney's Office, Richard H. Seamon of the United States Solicitor
General's Office, and Stuart C. Berman of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz in New York City, for
supplying me with copies of the briefs and other material from Minnesota v. Dickerson.
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section of the station house, the police release you. The gum-ball had
tested "negative" for evidence of narcotics.
Amazingly, both the Minnesota Court of Appeals and the Minneso-
ta Supreme Court approved of such police conduct in nearly identical
circumstances. 1 However, the Minnesota Supreme Court also held that
the officer's conduct in manipulating and then seizing a nonthreatening
object in the suspect's pocket exceeded the scope of a weapons frisk.2
Justice Byron White, writing for seven justices of the United States
Supreme Court, agreed. 3 In a unanimous portion of the opinion, how-
ever, the Court also recognized an officer's right to seize nonthreatening
objects during a weapons frisk if the objects' incriminating nature is
"immediately apparent." 4 Thus, Minnesota v. Dickerson5 extended the
plain-view doctrine 6 to include "plain touch," effectively authorizing
police officers to seize nonthreatening objects discovered during a
weapons frisk.
Before a trial court reaches a plain-touch issue, it must first deter-
mine whether the investigating officers properly stopped 7 and frisked the
suspect. After examining the Dickerson record,8 the thought that two
reviewing courts would so readily accept trial court findings that the
police properly stopped and frisked the suspect in circumstances such as
those described above is chilling indeed. There is no question, it seems,
that police officers may forcibly stop a pedestrian merely because he9
looked toward them and abruptly changed direction. A twelve-unit
apartment building where police officers had at one time or another
seized guns and narcotics is classified, in its entirety, as a "crack
house."lO Everyone leaving the building is regarded with suspicion.
1. State v. Dickerson, 469 N.W.2d 462, 465 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) [hereinafter Dickerson 1];
State v. Dickerson, 481 N.W.2d 840, 843 (Minn. 1992) [hereinafter Dickerson 11].
2. Dickerson 11, 481 N.W.2d at 846. For an explanation of the limited weapons frisk permitted
under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), see infra text accompanying notes 97-139.
3. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. 2130, 2138-39 (1993) [hereinafter Dickerson III].
4. Dickerson III, 113 S. Ct. at 2137.
5. 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993).
6. For an explanation of the plain-view doctrine, see infra text accompanying notes 35-80.
7. For an explanation of an investigative stop, see infra text accompanying notes 140-76.
8. For an extensive analysis of the. Dickerson record, see infra text accompanying notes 140-76;
and Part IV infra.
9. As Prosser and Keeton note in their renowned treatise, I use the pronouns "he," "his," and
"him" at various points in this article "to avoid the awkward grammatical situations which would likely
occur due to the limitations of the English language." W. PAGE KEE'rON, Er. AL., PRosSER AND KEEroN
ON TORTS xvii (5th ed. 1984). The reader should also note that I based my opening hypothetical on the
Dickerson scenario, which involved men only.
10. See Memorandum and Order of the Fourth Judicial Circuit, reprinted in the Petition for a Writ
of Certiorari, Appendix C,.at C-4, Minnesota v. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993) (No. 91-2019)
(describing the apartment building as "a known crack house" and "a notorious 'crack house');
Dickerson, 469 N.W.2d at 464 ("[Officer Vernon D.] Rose described the 12-unit apartment building
at 1030 Morgan Avenue as a 'known crack house') [hereinafter Trial Court Findings]; Dickerson 11,
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After Dickerson, one wonders whether our courts now regard poverty-
stricken urban neighborhoods as "authoritarian twilight zones"li where
the police may seize and search people on sight.
The factual scenario presented in Minnesota v. Dickerson under-
scores the need for a trial court to thoroughly examine the record to
determine whether a police officer was properly justified in stopping a
suspect and then frisking him for weapons. At trial and on appeal,
Timothy Dickerson challenged the state's assertion that the investigating
officers properly stopped him upon a reasonable suspicion that he was
engaged in criminal activity, and that they feared he was armed and
dangerous when they frisked him.12 On the state's appeal to the United
States Supreme Court, however, Dickerson did not challenge the lower
courts' findings that the police officers had properly conducted the stop
and the frisk.13 Justice White, therefore, accepted the lower court find-
ings on these issues, and limited the Court's discussion first to whether a
plain-touch doctrine exists, 14 and then to whether Officer Vernon D.
Rose frisked Dickerson within the lawful bounds of Terry v. Ohiol5 and
the new plain-touch doctrine. 16 In defining the plain-touch doctrine,
however, the Court failed to explain what "lawful right of access" will
permit a police officer to reach into a suspect's clothing and seize a
nonthreatening object discovered during a frisk.
The purpose of this article is to examine some issues arising from
both the narrow facts of Dickerson and the theoretical underpinnings of
the plain-touch doctrine. Because the plain-touch doctrine applies the
plain-view doctrine to an officer's sensory perceptions during a weapons
frisk, Part II sketches the fundamentals of the plain-view doctrine and the
481 N.W.2d at 842 ("the officer said the apartment building was known as a 24-hour-a-day crack
house"); Dickerson III, 113 S. Ct. at 2133 ("[t]he officer ... considered the building to be a notorious
'crack house"').
11. See United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 564 (1985) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (using the phrase "authoritarian twilight zone" to describe those areas of the nation's
border where the government detains travelers based upon suspicions lower than probable cause to
believe that the travelers are engaged in criminal activity).
12. Transcript at 33-46, State v. Dickerson (No. 89067687) (Feb. 20, 1990); Dickerson H, 481
N.W.2d at 842-43; Dickerson 1, 469 N.W.2d at 464-65. See Defendant's Notice of Motion and Motion
to Dismiss for Lack of Probable Cause, State v. Dickerson (No. 89067687) (Jan. 31, 1990); State's
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, State v. Dickerson (No. 89067687)
(Feb. 1, 1990); State's Supplementary Memorandum Opposing Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, State v.
Dickerson (No. 89067687) (March 1, 1990); Defendant's Supplemental Memorandum in Support of
the Motion to Dismiss, State v. Dickerson (No. 89067687) (March 2, 1990). These items are reprinted
in the Joint Appendix at 10, 18, 24, and 27, Minnesota v. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993) (No. 91-
2019).
13. Dickerson III, 113 S. Ct. at 2138.
14. Id. at 2136-38.
15. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). For a discussion of Terry, see infra text accompanying notes 99-117.
16. Dickerson III, 113 S. Ct. at 2138-39.
1995] 213
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
weapons frisk exception. Part III explores Dickerson, the plain-touch
doctrine, and related issues. Part III, A, describes the history of
Dickerson, illustrating the facts primarily from Officer Rose's sworn
testimony, which trial Judge Robert H. Lynn credited as the accurate
description of the events of November 9, 1989-the evening when
Officer Rose discovered crack cocaine during his weapons frisk of
Dickerson. Part III, B, completes the definitional framework of the
plain-touch doctrine by explaining that the search-incident-to-arrest
exception to the Warrant Requirement will permit a police officer to
reach into a suspect's clothing and seize nonthreatening contraband
detected during a weapons frisk.
Part III, C, briefly examines a theoretical question left unresolved by
the case: whether an officer's tactile sensations during a weapons frisk
are sufficiently quick and reliable to provide the officer with probable
cause, as the plain-touch doctrine requires.17 Indeed, is it truly possible
for anyone to "immediately" identify an object sandwiched between
layers of clothing and a human body? Although Justice White discussed
the issue generally,18 he prudently avoided a definitive conclusion.
Unfortunately, the available data are also insufficient to resolve the issue.
For this reason, Part III, C, concludes that experts on sensory perception,
rather than lawyers or the courts, are the appropriate authorities to make
such conclusions once they have performed the necessary research. For
the present, a trial court must scrutinize its record to determine whether
an object's incriminating nature was "immediately apparent" to the
frisking officer.
Part IV examines whether Dickerson's behavior justified his stop
and the frisk that Officer Rose immediately performed upon stopping
him. I conclude first that the circumstances described in the record did
not support a forcible stop. When analyzing the frisk, I conclude that
neither Dickerson's behavior nor the crime that the officers may have
suspected entitled them to immediately frisk him. In light of the weak
record, which a total of three courts found to justify the initial "stop and
frisk," it appears that these issues no longer present serious obstacles to
warrantless searches for contraband conducted by over-zealous police
officers.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
A discussion of Fourth Amendment law necessarily begins with the
text of the amendment itself:
17. See infra text accompanying notes 239, 316-21.
18. Dickerson I1, 113 S. Ct. at 2137-38 & n.4.
214 [VOL. 71:211
1995] MINNESOTA V. DICKERSON
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.19
In the landmark case Katz v. United States,20 Justice Harlan ex-
plained the "twofold requirement" for Fourth Amendment protection:
[F]irst that a person ha[s] exhibited an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one
that society is prepared to recognize as "reasonable." Thus a
man's home is, for most purposes, a place where he expects
privacy, but objects, activities or statements that he exposes to
the "plain view" of outsiders are not "protected" because no
intention to keep them to himself has been exhibited.21
The Supreme Court has applied these criteria to determine whether
warrantless police conduct constitutes a Fourth Amendment "search." 22
The amendment applies to both federal and state officials,23 and consists
of two clauses. The first clause requires that searches and seizures be
"reasonable," while the second requires probable cause 24 to support
warrants for searches and seizures, including arrests.25
19. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
20. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
21. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
22. See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445,449-51 (1989) (opinion of White, J.) (finding that although
suspect exhibited an actual expectation of privacy by concealing the contents of his greenhouse from
street-level observation, his expectation of privacy was not reasonable because the marijuana in his
greenhouse could be observed through open ceiling panels from a helicopter hovering 400 feet above;
police, therefore, required no warrant to observe the greenhouse from a vantage point where the
general public was likewise free to observe the contraband); Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325
(1987), discussed infra at text accompanying notes 59-69 (finding that police officer's act of lifting
stereo equipment to record serial numbers constituted an invasion of the suspect's privacy that
amounted to a search); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211-15 (1986) (finding that although
suspect exhibited an actual expectation of privacy by surrounding his yard with a ten-foot fence, it
was unreasonable for the suspect to expect that his marijuana garden could not be observed by police
flying an airplane 1,000 feet above his yard; no warrant was, therefore, required to do so); Texas v.
Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 740 (1983) (opinion of Rehnquist, J.) ("tbhere is no legitimate expectation of
privacy shielding that portion of the interior of an automobile which may be viewed from outside the
vehicle by either inquisitive passersby or diligent police officers;" police officer, therefore, conducted
no search under the Fourth Amendment when he looked through the car's windows and saw
contraband located inside).
23. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 643 (1961) (holding "that all evidence obtained by searches and
seizures in violation of the Federal Constitution is inadmissible in a criminal trial in a state court").
24. For an explanation of probable cause, see infra text accompanying notes 318-19.
25. Fourth Amendment "seizures" include arrests, which Justice Stevens appropriately described
as "seizures of persons" in Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980). Since the Framers
connected the two clauses with the conjunctive "and," a strict grammarian could interpret the
amendment as requiring government authorities to always obtain a warrant in order to validate a
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Fourth Amendment case law also expresses a preference for the
police to obtain a warrant from an impartial judicial officer 26 before
conducting searches and seizures. 27 However, given the myriad situa-
tions that law enforcement officials must face every day, the split-second
decision-making these situations frequently demand, and the exigencies
that often make obtaining a search warrant impractical, 28 "what the
Constitution forbids is not all searches and seizures, but unreasonable
searches and seizures." 29
Warrantless searches and seizures, however, "are per se unreason-
able under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few specifically
established and well-delineated exceptions." 30 For example, the police
may search for and seize evidence without a warrant if exigent circum-
stances, such as the imminent destruction or removal of evidence, require
search. Lloyd L. Weinreb, Generalities of the Fourth Amendment, 42. U. CHI. L. REV. 47, 47 (1974).
Such a strict grammatical construction, of course, would unduly constrain law enforcement activities,
such as the removal of weapons from arrestees, which usually takes place without a warrant. Id.
26. E.g., Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 110-11 (1964). Additionally, in Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971), the Court invalidated a search warrant signed and issued by the state
Attorney General, who simultaneously acted as both the chief coordinator of police activities relating
to the murder investigation at issue and as justice of the peace. 403 U.S. at 447, 453. The Attorney
General also later acted as the chief prosecutor at trial. Id. at 447. Under these circumstances,
Justice Stewart held that "[slince he was not the neutral and detached magistrate required by the
Constitution, the search stands on no firmer ground than if there had been no warrant at all." Id. at
453.
27. E.g., Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 735 (1983) ("Our cases hold that procedure by way of
warrant is preferred) (plurality opinion of Rehnquist, J.); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980)
(invalidating the warrantless arrests of two suspects in their homes where the police had ample time to
obtain arrest warrants); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 758 (1979) ("In the ordinary case .... a
search of private property must be both reasonable and pursuant to a properly issued search
warrant"); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968) ("the police must, whenever practicable, obtain
advance judicial approval of searches and seizures through the warrant procedure").
State and federal courts enforce the Fourth Amendment's protection through the exclusionary
rule, which holds that evidence seized by law enforcement officials in violation of the Fourth
Amendment is inadmissible at trial against the defendant. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1968);
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,655 (1961); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206,222 (1960); Weeks v.
United States, 232 U.S. 383,391-93 (1914).
28. E.g., Terry, 392 U.S. at 12.
29. Elkins, 364 U.S. at 222.
30. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,357 (1967).
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swift action.31 Another exception allows the police to conduct a full
search of an arrestee incident to a lawful arrest. 32 In Minnesota v.
Dickerson, the Supreme Court applied both the plain-view doctrine and
the weapons frisk exception of Terry v. Ohio33 in holding that the
Constitution permits a police officer to seize contraband discovered
through "plain touch." 34 A more extensive discussion of the plain-view
doctrine and the stop-and-frisk cases is, therefore, in order.
A. THE PLAIN-VIEw DOCTRINE
Justice Stewart's plurality opinion in Coolidge v. New Hampshire35
represented the Supreme Court's first attempt to fully explain the plain-
view doctrine, although the Court was well aware of it prior to
Coolidge.36 The Court has refined the doctrine so that it now encom-
31. United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51-52 (1951) (warrantless search of hotel room held
unconstitutional because there was no threat of "imminent destruction, removal, or concealment of the
property intended to be seized"); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451,455 (1948) (invalidating a
warrantless search of the defendant's boarding room where the police had no grounds to believe that
the property was "in the process of destruction []or as likely to be destroyed"); Johnson v. United
States, 333 U.S. 10, 14-15 (1948) (warrantless search of hotel room where "[n]o evidence or
contraband was threatened with removal or destruction" held unconstitutional). In Vale v. Louisiana,
399 U.S. 30 (1970), Justice Stewart listed the fact that the evidence was "not in the process of
destruction" among the reasons for striking down the warrantless search and seizure at issue in that
case. 399 U.S. at 35. Professor LaFave, however, has suggested that the "exigent circumstances"
necessary to dispense with the Wan-ant Requirement are broader than this statement would imply. See
2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARcH AND SEizuRE §6.5 (b) (2d ed. 1987 & Supp. 1994). Justice Douglas' broad
language in McDonald supports Professor LaFave's position. As noted above, in McDonald, Justice
Douglas remarked that there was no evidence to support a warrantless search and seizure because
nothing in the case suggested that the evidence was "in the process of destruction, [or] likely to be
destroyed." 335 U.S. at 455 (emphasis added).
Other "exigent circumstances" include danger to the police or others, Warden v. Hayden, 387
U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967) (upholding the warrantless search of a private residence for an armed robber
and his weapons where delay would "gravely endanger" the police or "the lives of others"), and the
imminent destruction of evidence discovered on a suspect's person, Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 296
(1973) (permitting the police to take scrapings from a murder suspect's fingernails where the suspect
attempted to clean his nails after the police noticed what they thought was dried blood beneath his
nails).
32. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224, 235 (1973). For a further discussion of the
search-incident-to-arrest exception, see infra notes 246-48 and accompanying text.
33. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
34. Dickerson 11, 113 S. Ct. 2130, 2137-38 (1993).
35. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
36. In Coolidge, Justice Stewart attempted to articulate a plain-view doctrine which had actually
developed in numerous cases over the previous 50 years, dating back to Prohibition-Era liquor
possession cases. See Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498, 504 (1925) (upholding the seizure of
whiskey barrels and bottling equipment discovered in plain view where the search warrant only
authorized the officers to search for and seize "cases of whiskey"); Harris v. United States, 390 U.S.
234, 236 (1968) ("It has long been settled that objects falling in the plain view of an officer who has a
right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be introduced in
evidence."); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (noting that
"objects, activities, or statements that . .. [one] exposes to the 'plain view' of outsiders are not
'protected' because no intention to keep them to himself has been exhibited"). See also supra text
accompanying notes 20-21.
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passes three requirements. First, a law enforcement officer must observe
the object in question from a position where he has a lawful right to be.37
Thus, a police officer may not walk across a homeowner's lawn in order
to look into the house windows, but a city police officer walking his
"beat" may glance into the open window of a street-level apartment and
observe exposed objects located inside.38 Second, the object's incrimi-
nating character must be immediately apparent, 39 giving the officer
probable cause to believe that it is contraband or evidence of a crime.40
The officer's examination of the suspicious object is "a truly cursory
37. Dickerson 111, 113 S. Ct. 2130, 2136 (1993); Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136 (1990).
38. State v. Taylor, 401 N.E.2d 459 (Ohio Ct. App. 1978). Taylor involved an apartment complex
that had a walkway connected to a public sidewalk. The walkway ran along the building, providing
residents and visitors with access to various apartments. Id. at 460. No "No Trespass" signs were
posted, and the walkway "was freely accessible" to the public. Id. at 461. The suspects' apartment,
which was visible from the walkway, had a large bay window "with no curtains or other obstructions
other than a hanging plant." Id. at 460. A police officer standing on the walkway looked into the bay
window and observed the two suspects handling a substance that he recognized as marijuana. Id. He
approached the front door, knocked twice, received no response, and returned to the walkway after
hearing noises within the apartment. Id. at 461. He then saw one suspect walking toward the rear of
the apartment, carrying the suspected marijuana and looking backward toward the front. Id. Another
officer arrested this suspect as he left through the back door. Id. Both officers eventually seized the
contraband and arrested the other suspect. Id.
The Ohio Court of Appeals concluded that the first officer acted properly in viewing the
contraband and suspicious activity from the walkway, noting that the suspects' activities were equally
visible to other apartment residents and visitors. Id. at 461-62. The court, therefore, reasoned that the
officer "was a licensee who had a right to be on the sidewalk within the premises, even though the
purpose was to observe potentially illegal activity." Id. at 462. "[Wlhatever was observed by the
officer was usable in determining probable cause for arrest." Id. The seizure of the evidence,
therefore, "was a proper incident to the lawful arrests." Id.
The court also distinguished Taylor from an unreported case, State v. DeShong, No. 43347
(Franklin County, Ohio, Court of Common Pleas, Oct. 21, 1966), cited in Taylor, 401 N.E.2d at 462,
where police officers left a public sidewalk and approached a suspect's house, "pushing aside
shrubbery in front of a bedroom window and then peering through a small gap under the venetian
blind to observe illegal activity." 401 N.E.2d at 462. In that case, the officers violated the Constitution
by invading the home's curtilage. Id. DeShong was also distinguishable because the suspects had
demonstrated an intention to preserve their privacy by shielding "their activities from other members
of the public," in contrast to the suspects in Taylor. Id.
For similar reasoning applied to observations made through the unobstructed window of an
automobile on a public street, see Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983) (opinion of Rehnquist, J.):
The general public could peer into the interior of [the defendant's] automobile from any
number of angles; there is no reason [Tom] Maples should be precluded from observing
as an officer what would be entirely visible to him as a private citizen. There is no
legitimate expectation of privacy shielding that portion of the interior of an automobile
which may be viewed from outside the vehicle by either inquisitive passersby or diligent
police officers.
Id. at 740 (citations omitted).
39. Dickerson 11I, 113 S. Ct. at 2136-37; Horton, 496 U.S. at 136; Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 320,
at 326-27 (1987); Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 466.
40. Hicks, 480 U.S. at 326 (holding that law enforcement officials must have probable cause in
order to invoke the plain-view doctrine). See also Dickerson II1, 113 S. Ct. at 2137 ("If ... the police
lack probable cause to believe that an object in plain view is contraband without conducting some
further search of the object-i.e., if 'its incriminating character [is not] "immediately
apparent:" -the plain view doctrine cannot justify its seizure" (brackets in original) (citing Horton,
496 U.S. at 2308)).
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inspection-one that involves merely looking at what is already exposed
to view, without disturbing it."41 Third, if an officer immediately
recognizes an object in plain sight 42 as contraband or evidence of a
crime, he must have a lawful right of access to the object before seizing
it.43 At the moment the officer develops probable cause to suspect that
the object is contraband, he has grounds to apply for a search warrant.
Absent a warrant, the officer may not take further intrusive action to
seize the object unless an exception to the Warrant Requirement applies
that would give him a "lawful right of access" to the object. 44  As
Justice Stewart said in Coolidge:
[P]lain view alone is never enough to justify the warrantless
seizure of evidence. . . . Incontrovertible testimony of the
senses that an incriminating object is on premises belonging to
a criminal suspect may establish the fullest possible measure of
probable cause. But even where the object is contraband, this
Court has repeatedly stated and enforced the basic rule that the
police may not enter and make a warrantless seizure.45
In Horton v. California ,46 the Supreme Court explicitly stated that
these three requirements must be satisfied in order to support a seizure
under the plain-view doctrine. 47 In Horton, two masked men armed
41. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. at 328 (emphasis added).
42. It is important to distinguish "plain view," as used in Coolidge to justify
seizure of an object, from an officer's mere observation of an item left in
plain view. Whereas the latter generally involves no Fourth Amendment
search, the former generally does implicate the Amendment's limitations
upon seizures of personal property. The information obtained as a result of
observation of an object in plain sight may be the basis for probable cause
or reasonable suspicion of illegal activity. In turn, these levels of suspicion
may, in some cases, justify police conduct affording them access to a
particular item.
Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730,738 n.4 (1983) (opinion of Rehnquist, J.) (citations omitted).
43. Dickerson 111, 113 S. Ct. at 2137; Horton, 496 U.S. at 137.
44. See People v. Pakula, 411 NE.2d 1385, 1390 (I11. App. Ct. 1980) (explaining that a seizure
under the plain-view doctrine must be supported by an applicable exception to the warrant
requirement).
45. 403 U.S. at 468.
46. 496 U.S. 128 (1990).
47. Justice Stevens stated the three requirements for a constitutional seizure under the plain-view
doctrine as follows:
It is, of course, an essential predicate to any valid warrantless seizure of incriminating
evidence that the officer did not violate the Fourth Amendment in arriving at the place
from which the evidence could be plainly viewed. There are, moreover, two additional
conditions that must be satisfied to justify the warrantless seizure. First, not only must the
item be in plain view; its incriminating character must also be "immediately apparent."..
. Second, not only must the officer be lawfully located in a place from which the object
can be plainly seen .... he or she must also have a lawful right of access to the object
itself.
Horton, 496 U.S. at 136-37. These three requirements for seizures under the plain-view doctrine are
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with a machine gun and an electric stun gun disabled, handcuffed, and
robbed the treasurer of the San Jose Coin Club upon his return home
from the club's annual show.48  The investigating police officer
developed probable cause to believe that evidence of the armed robbery
was located in the suspect Horton's home.49 Although the magistrate
issued a warrant specifically authorizing a search for the proceeds of the
robbery, the officer later admitted that during his search he was also
interested in obtaining other evidence not specified in the warrant.5 0
During his search, he discovered and seized an Uzi machine gun, a .38
caliber revolver, two stun guns, a handcuff key, a San Jose Coin Club
advertising brochure, and a few articles of the victim's clothing-items
that were in plain view during the search.51 It is important to note that
the officer saw other handguns and rifles in plain view, but he did not
seize them because he lacked probable cause to believe that they were
also evidence of crime.52
Justice Stevens found that the plain-view doctrine authorized the
officer to seize the evidence in question. 53 First, the officer observed the
evidence from a location where he had a lawful right to be-he was
present in Horton's home under the authority of a validly issued search
warrant.5 4 He also limited his search to those areas where he would
logically find the items described in the warrant.5 5 Second, the objects'
also listed in Dickerson II1, 113 S. Ct. 2130, 2136-37 (1993); United States v. Legg, 18 F.3d 240, 242
(4th Cir. 1994); Clark v. Commonwealth, 868 S.W.2d 101, 106 (Ky. Ct. App. 1994).
48. Horton, 496 U.S. at 130.
49. Id. at 130-31.
50. Id. at 131. The officer's affidavit for the search warrant had described both the weapons and
the proceeds, but for unknown reasons the magistrate declined to issue a warrant to search for the
weapons. Id.
51. Id. at 131.
52. Id. at 131,n.1.
53. Horton, 496 U.S. at 142.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 131. Justice Stewart's plurality opinion in Coolidge described a requirement that
searches and seizures of objects in plain view be "inadvertent," 403 U.S. at 469-71, but a majority of
the court never accepted this reasoning. See Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730,737 (1983). In upholding
the seizure in Horton, the Court rejected this requirement. Justice Stevens reasoned first that courts
should apply "objective standards of conduct," rather than probing the officer's subjective intentions,
to determine whether the search and/or seizure violated the Fourth Amendment. 496 U.S. at 138-39.
Second, he continued, judging the officer's objective conduct rather than his subjective intentions is
consistent with the Fourth Amendment's requirement that warrants particularly describe "'the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized' because the officer will search only those areas
described in the warrant. Id. at 139 (citation omitted). In other words, an improper motive will not
necessarily invalidate a search or a seizure.
Under Horton, therefore, as long as an officer confines his lawful search to those areas where
he is likely to find the objects described in the warrant, he may seize other incriminating evidence that
appears in those same areas regardless of whether he expected to find other evidence. Id. at 138-41.
He may not expand his search to areas where he is unlikely to find the things described in the warrant.
As Justice White said in his Coolidge concurring opinion, "(plolice with a warrant for a rifle may
search only places where rifles might be and must terminate the search once the rifle is found; the
inadvertence rule will in no way reduce the number of places into which they may lawfully look."
Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 517 (White, J., concurring) (quoted with approval in Horton, 496 U.S. at 141).
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incriminating nature was immediately apparent to him.56 The officer
knew that the suspects had used a machine gun, a stun gun, and hand-
cuffs during the robbery. The connection between the San Jose Coin
Club advertising brochure and the victim's position as that organization's
treasurer was obvious. These factors created probable cause to believe
that the objects constituted evidence of the crime. 57 Finally, the officer
had a lawful right of access to the items because the search warrant
authorized him to be in a position where he could seize them. Requiring
the officer to obtain an additional warrant would simply have wasted
time. In sum, wrote Justice Stevens, the warrant authorized the search;
the plain-view doctrine authorized the seizure. 58
The plain-view doctrine's three criteria may also be applied to
Arizona v. Hicks,59 although Hicks was decided before Horton explicitly
adopted the three criteria. In Hicks, police officers entered an apartment
in response to a reported gunshot and conducted a warrantless search for
the suspected shooter, his weapons, and possible victims. 60 During the
search, one officer suspected that two sets of expensive stereo equipment
were stolen, 6' and moved some of the components in order to record
their serial numbers, which he reported to headquarters.62 When the
serial number check revealed that a turntable was stolen in an armed
robbery, the officer seized it immediately.63 The authorities later deter-
mined that the other components were stolen in the same armed robbery,
obtained a warrant, and seized that equipment as well.64 Under these
circumstances, Justice Scalia held that moving the equipment in order to
In Horton, Justice Stevens similarly remarked that "if the three rings and other items named in the
warrant had been found at the outset - or if petitioner had them in his possession and had responded
to the warrant by producing them immediately - no search for weapons could have taken place."
496 U.S. at 141.
The same limitation holds true, of course, for items discovered in plain view during legitimate
warrantless searches. 496 U.S. at 139-40 (a warrantless search is "circumscribed by the exigencies
which justify its initiation"). Justice Stevens therefore concluded that the interest in preventing the
police from conducting general searches, "or from converting specific warrants into general warrants
• .. is already served by the requirements that no warrant issue unless it 'particularly describ[es the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized,' and that a warrantless search be
circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation." 496 U.S. at 139-40. For an example of an
officer improperly expanding a search, see Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987), discussed infra at
text accompanying notes 59-69.
56. 496 U.S. at 142.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. 480 U.S. 321 (1987).
60. Id. at 323-24.
61. Id. at 323.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 323-24.
64. Hicks, 480 U.S. at 323-24.
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expose the serial numbers constituted a search separate from the initial
lawful search for the shooter, his weapons, and possible victims. 65
Merely inspecting those parts of the turntable that came into
view during the latter search would not have constituted an
independent search, because it would have produced no
additional invasion of respondent's privacy interest. But taking
action, unrelated to the objectives of the authorized intrusion,
which exposed to view concealed portions of the apartment or
its contents, did produce a new invasion of respondent's privacy
unjustified by the Fourth Amendment. It matters not that the
search uncovered nothing of any great personal value to
respondent -serial numbers rather than (what might conceiv-
ably have been hidden behind or under the equipment) letters
or photographs. A search is a search, even if it happens to
disclose nothing but the bottom of a turntable.66
The exigent circumstances of the shooting justified the initial
warrantless search for the shooter, victims, and weapons, and the seizure
of three weapons. 67 Exigent circumstances also placed the police
officers in a position where they could lawfully observe other potentially
incriminating evidence. After concluding that moving the stereo equip-
ment constituted a separate search, however, Justice Scalia found no
similar justification for this second search. Because simply viewing the
exterior of the stereo equipment was insufficient to provide the officers
with probable cause to believe that the equipment was stolen, the second
search violated the Warrant Requirement. 68 Since the officer did not
have probable cause to believe the equipment was stolen until after this
unconstitutional second search, 69 it logically follows that the equipment's
incriminating nature was not "immediately apparent."
People v. Pakula,70 decided prior to Hicks and Horton, is also
instructive. In Pakula, police officers investigating a tip stood on a
public sidewalk one block away from the suspects' property and ob-
served cannabis plants growing in the suspects' back yard, which was
surrounded by a chain link fence. 71 The officers verified their observa-
tion by entering a neighboring property, where they saw large, cultivated
65. Id. at 324-25.
66. Id. at 325 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
67. Id. at 323, 325.
68. Id. at 326, 328.
69. Hicks, 480 U.S. at 323, 326 (the state conceded that, prior to moving the equipment and
reporting the serial numbers, the officer "had only 'reasonable suspicion,' by which it means
something less than probable cause") (citation omitted).
70. 411 N.E.2d 1385 (111. App. Ct. 1980).
71. Id. at 1387.
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cannabis plants tied to stakes in the suspects' yard. 72 The officers then
left and returned approximately thirty minutes later with uniformed
officers to assist in seizing the cannabis, but did not obtain a warrant. 73
When one suspect refused to consent to the officers' warrantless entry,
the officers simply opened the fence gate, 74 entered the back yard, seized
the cannabis plants, and then arrested the suspect. 75 The police offered
no reason to explain why they failed to obtain a warrant, and the facts
indicated that they had ample opportunity to do so. 76 The trial court
found that the police made their initial observations "from a location
where they had a right to be," 77 but suppressed the cannabis because the
police failed to obtain a warrant and because no exigent circumstances
existed to excuse the police from obtaining a warrant. 78 The Illinois
Appellate Court agreed, concluding that "the warrantless intrusion into
the defendants' privacy is not justifiable merely by a pre-intrusion plain
view observation." 79
Applying the three criteria of the plain-view doctrine, Pakula can be
re-stated as follows: (1) the police observed incriminating evidence from
a position where they had a lawful right to be; (2) the incriminating
nature of the cannabis was immediately apparent, giving the officers
probable cause to believe that the plants were contraband; but (3) the
officers did not have a lawful right of access to the cannabis because
they did not obtain a warrant and because no exception to the warrant
requirement applied to justify their warrantless entry. As the Appellate
Court observed,
The doctrine of plain view is not an exception itself to the
requirement that a search or seizure must be supported by a
warrant issued by a judge upon a finding of probable cause.
Plain view serves only to provide a means of satisfying the
requirement of probable cause. Without the simultaneous
existence of one of the true exceptions to the warrant require-
ment, plain view cannot substitute probable cause, rightly
thought to exist by a police officer[,] for the impartial decision
of a neutral and -detached magistrate capable of fairly deter-
mining whether probable cause truly exists.80
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1387, 1389.
74. Id. at 1389.
75. Pakula, 411 N.E.2d at 1387. The other suspect was arrested several days later. Id.
76. Id. at 1387, 1389.
77. Id. at 1386.
78. Id. at 1386-87.
79. Pakula, 411 N.E.2d at 1389-90.
80. Id. at 1390 (emphasis added). See also Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 738-39 (1983)
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Courts have historically applied reasoning analogous to that of the
plain-view doctrine in situations where other sensory perceptions, such as
hearing and smell, give the officer probable cause to believe that a crime
has been committed. Cases in which government agents employed their
sense of hearing date back at least to the nineteenth century. For exam-
ple, in the 1890 case State v. McAfee,81 a local justice of the peace
overheard an argument between the defendant and his wife.
[H]e heard a blow given as with a stick, and a woman's voice
cried out very loud, as if in distress. In a few minutes
thereafter, the defendant and his wife came along the road, and
the defendant had a stick in his hand and was cursing and
talking violently, and his wife was crying in a loud voice.82
Based upon this evidence, the North Carolina Supreme Court held
that a breach of the peace had occurred in the officer's presence, which
entitled him to arrest the defendant without a warrant.8 3 In other words,
the officer's auditory observations enabled him to make a warrantless
seizure of the person.84 Likewise, modem-day courts deciding "plain-
hearing" cases have held that law enforcement officials do not violate
the Fourth Amendment when they overhear conversations or other
incriminating noises with their unaided ears.8 5
(explaining that "'[p]lain view' is perhaps better understood ... not as an independent 'exception' to
the Warrant Clause, but simply as an extension of whatever the prior justification for an officer's
'access to an object' may be"). Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498 (1925), also illustrates the
parameters of the plain-view doctrine. In Steele, two Prohibition agents observed the suspects loading
cases marked "whiskey" into a garage which was ostensibly part of an auto truck service. Id. at 500,
502. Upon making this observation, one agent left the scene, applied for a warrant, and returned one
hour later, after a U.S. Commissioner had issued the search warrant. Id. at 502. The important point to
note here is that the agents entered and searched the premises only after one agent obtained a valid
search warrant, rather than searching the premises immediately upon observing the incriminating
evidence. See id. at 502-03. Once the agents gained entrance to the premises via the search warrant,
they observed other incriminating evidence of illicit liquor operations, including a corking machine, 33
cases of gin, and other items, which they seized in addition to the "cases of whiskey" specified in the
warrant. Id. at 503. The Court upheld the seizure of these items on the ground that the warrant was
"quite specific enough." Id. at 504.
81. 12 S.E. 435 (N.C. 1890).
82. Id. at 436.
83. Id. at 437.
84. As noted supra at note 25, an arrest is a "seizure of the person." Payton v. New York, 445
US. 573, 585 (1980) (opinion of Stevens, J.).
85. United States v. Pace, 709 F. Supp. 948,954 (C D. Cal. 1989) ("The 'plain hearing' exception
has been recognized as a legitimate analogue to the plain view doctrine .... Under the 'plain hearing'
exception, if police officers overhear statements without the benefit of listening devices while they are
stationed at a lawful vantage point, then those statements are admissible at trial.") (citations omitted).
See also United States v. Fisch, 474 F.2d 1071, 1076-78 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 921 (1973)
(incriminating statements overheard by officer using his unaided ear while lying next to the crack of a
door adjoining suspects' hotel room held admissible because officer conducted no "search").
Professor LaFave also uses Fisch to illustrate a permissible plain-hearing situation. 1 LAFAvE, supra
note 31, §2.2(a) at 326-27. But see Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (holding that the
warrantless electronic surveillance of a suspect's telephone conversations constituted a search and
seizure of evidence in violation of the Fourth Amendment).
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Cases involving the sense of smell date back to Prohibition-era
episodes in which law enforcement officials detected the presence or use
of illicit liquor through its distinctive odor. 86 The unique aroma of
opium also gave government agents probable cause to suspect illegal
-activity. In the 1948 case Johnson v. United States,87 experienced
narcotics agents conducting an investigation at a hotel immediately
recognized "a strong odor of burning opium," which led them to a
room in the hotel.88 When the room's occupant denied the existence of
any such odor, the agents arrested her and searched the room without a
warrant. 89 The search revealed opium and opium smoking equipment.90
In reversing the conviction, Justice Jackson wrote that when the police
officers smelled the aroma of opium emanating from the suspect's
apartment, this fact gave the officers probable cause to apply for a
warrant. 91 Probable cause did not entitle them to forcibly enter the
premises without a warrant and search for contraband. 92 The trial court,
therefore, should have suppressed the evidence of opium and opium
smoking apparatus. Justice Jackson also suggested that the officers may
have performed a warrantless search and seizure to avoid such exigencies
as the suspect's possible flight, or the destruction of evidence. 93 He
found, however, that such exigencies did not exist. 94 In another case
involving the sense of smell, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals applied
reasoning very similar to that of Justice Scalia in Hicks to conclude that
an officer's squeezing or manipulation of a container in order to pro-
86. See United States v. McBride, 284 F. 416 (5th Cir. 1922). In McBride, the Court of Appeals
upheld the admission into evidence of testimony that two federal Prohibition agents had seized an illicit
liquor still from the premises of the defendant. Id. at 417. The agents had discovered the still when
they smelled the fumes of whiskey in the process of manufacture as they passed the stable that housed
the still. Id. at 416. The court reasoned that the smell caused the officers to detect a crime being
committed in their "presence," which entitled them to enter the premises, arrest the suspects and seize
the still without a warrant. Id. at 419. This reasoning is, of course, questionable under modern case
law, especially in light of Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948), discussed infra at text
accompanying notes 87-94. See also State v. McDaniel, 237 P. 373 (Or. 1925) (upholding the seizure
of a flask of whiskey that investigating officers discovered during their warrantless search of the
suspect). The court held that the investigating officers justifiably believed that the suspect had
committed a crime in their presence by detecting the odor of liquor on his breath. Id. at 375-76. In
comparing the reliability of sight with smell, the court pointedly remarked: "Sense of smell is often
more unerring than that of sight. Lipton's tea might look ever so much like Scotch whiskey and fool
many people dependent solely upon sight, but few would be misled through the sense of smell." Id. at
375.
87. 333 US. 10 (1948).
88. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 12 (1948).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 13-15.
92. Id.
93. Johnson, 333 U.S. at 14-15.
94. Id. at 15.
1995] 225
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 71:211
duce an incriminating odor constituted a search under the Fourth
Amendment .95
Given the historical application of plain-view reasoning to observa-
tions made with other senses, it is not surprising that the Court has finally
applied plain-view reasoning to the sense of touch. Because the situation
that will most often place an officer lawfully in a position to invoke the
plain-touch doctrine will involve a weapons frisk,96 a brief overview of
the weapons-frisk precedents follows.
B. THE WEAPONS FRISK
In Minnesota v. Dickerson 97 a police officer detected contraband
while conducting a weapons frisk,98 a procedure first recognized as
95. Hernandez v. United States, 353 F.2d 624, 626 (9th Cir. 1966). In Hernandez, an officer at
the Los Angeles Airport, responding to reports of a traveler suspected of smuggling marijuana in two
suitcases, went to the storage area where the bags waited to be loaded onto the suspect's flight. Id.
The officer lifted the bags to feel their weight, and squeezed them to force air from their interior. Id.
The officer smelled the distinct odor of marijuana, as did two narcotics officers who subsequently
arrived and repeated the same procedure. Id. The officers then located the suspect, arrested him,
and opened the bags after the arrest. Id. Applying reasoning very similar to that used by Justice
Scalia in finding that the movement of stereo equipment in Hicks constituted a "search," the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals held that the manipulation of the suspect's bags constituted a warrantless
search:
The government argues that the bags were not searched until they were opened. We
cannot agree. The manipulation of appellant's bags by Sergeant Butler prior to
appellant's arrest constituted a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
The contents of the bags were not exposed to Sergeant Butler's sight or smell before the
bags were squeezed. He detected the odor of marihuana as the result of an "exploratory
investigation," an "invasion or quest," a "prying into hidden places for that which was
concealed"-conduct which has been repeatedly said to characterize a "search."
Hernandez, 353 F. Supp. at 626. The court went on to conclude, however, that this warrantless search
was necessitated by exigent circumstances because the suspect's night flight was due to depart in two
hours and the officers could not obtain a warrant before the following morning. Id. at 627.
Professor LaFave cites Hernandez for the proposition that "if the officer has to force air out of the
effects in order to detect the odor, that conduct may be found to constitute a search." I LAFAVE, supra
note 31, §2.2(a) at 327-28. LaFave also suggests, however, that such a result "is not beyond dispute"
because "it might be contended that [the officer's] squeezing of the bags did not intrude upon
appellant's justified expectation of privacy in that Hernandez could not have reasonably expected that
suitcases placed with an airline for loading, shipment and unloading would be handled more
delicately." Id. at 328. See also Guidi v. Superior Court, 513 P.2d 908 (Cal. 1973) (upholding the
search and seizure of a closed shopping bag containing hashish where the police had noticed an
obvious odor of hashish emitted from the bag).
96. For a description of a weapons frisk, see infra note 98.
97. 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993).
98. In Dickerson, Justice Scalia provided an excellent illustration of a weapons frisk when he
quoted an instructive police manual:
Check the subject's neck and collar. A check should be made under the subject's arm.
Next a check should be made of the upper back. The lower back should also be
checked.
A check should be made of the upper part of the man's chest and the lower region
around the stomach. The belt, a favorite concealment spot, should be checked. The
inside thigh and crotch area also should be searched. The legs should be checked for
possible weapons. The last items to be checked are the shoes and cuffs of the subject.
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permissible under the Fourth Amendment in Terry v. Ohio.99 In Terry,
the Court held that:
where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads
him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that
criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom
he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in
the course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as
a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where noth-
ing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his
reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he is entitled for
the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a
carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons
in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to
assault him. Such a search is a reasonable search under the
Fourth Amendment, and any weapons seized may properly be
introduced in evidence against the person from whom they
were taken.lO0
Terry was a fact-sensitive case in which the Court responded to the
everyday, on-the-street needs of police officers executing their duties.101
In Terry, the suspicious behavior of two (later three) individuals in front
of a store in downtown Cleveland drew the attention of plain clothes
police detective Martin McFadden, a thirty-nine-year veteran of the force
who had patrolled this particular area for thirty years.10 2 Detective
McFadden's considerable experience enabled him to swiftly determine
whether an individual's behavior warranted further investigation, 0 3 which
he conducted in this case by continuing to observe the men for approxi-
mately twelve minutes from a store entrance approximately 300 to 400
feet away.10 4 After his observations confirmed his suspicion that the
men Were planning an armed robbery, Officer McFadden approached
them, identified himself as a police officer, and asked for their names. 10 5
"When the men 'mumbled something' in response to his inquiries,
Dickerson III, 113 S. Ct. at 2140 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting J. MOYNAHAN, POUCE SEARCHING
PROCEDURES 7 (1963)).
99. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
100. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,30-31 (1968).
101. See id. at 20 ("we deal here with an entire rubric of police conduct - necessarily swift
action predicated upon the on-the-spot observations of the officer on the beat - which historically has
not been, and as a practical matter could not be, subjected to the warrant procedure").
102. Id. at 5.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 5-6.
105. Terry, 392 U.S. at 6-7.
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Officer McFadden grabbed petitioner Terry, spun him around . . .and
patted down the outside of his clothing."106 This frisk revealed a
gun.107 Officer McFadden recovered another gun when he frisked the
second man, but ceased his search of the three when his frisk of the third
suspect uncovered no weapons.O 8 As the Court noted, the crux of the
case was not the propriety of Officer McFadden's initial investigation, but
whether the Fourth Amendment permitted him to extend his investiga-
tion to physically search the suspects for weapons.O 9
The Court held this warrantless search "reasonable" under the
Fourth Amendment, reasoning that an officer must "point to specific
and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from
those facts, reasonably warrant" his invasion of an individual's constitu-
tionally protected personal security.' 10  The Court, therefore, noted
Officer McFadden's detailed observations of the three men, which
heightened his suspicion until he believed that the men were preparing
for an armed robbery, and ultimately led him to confront and disarm
them.il1 The Court also factored the officer's experience into its analy-
sis, explaining that "in determining whether the officer acted reasonably
in such circumstances, due weight must be given, not to his inchoate and
unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch,' but to the specific reasonable
inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his
experience."112
The Court's primary concern was unquestionably for the safety of
officers and bystanders. Thus, the two key observations that Officer
McFadden made prior to his pat-down frisk were (1) that he suspected
the men of casing a "stick-up"' 13 -a "crime of violence" 114 in Justice
Harlan's words, and (2) "that he feared 'they may have a gun."'115 The
106. Id. at 7.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 23.
110. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21. The Court noted that the Fourth Amendment's "right of personal
security belongs as much to the citizen on the streets of our cities as to the homeowner closeted in his
study to dispose of his secret affairs." Id. at 9-10.
Ill. Id. at 5-7, 22-23.
112. Id. at 27.
113. Id. at 6.
114. Id. at 33 (Harlan, J., concurring).
115. Terry, 392 U.S. at 6. The Court also emphasized its concern about violence as the
cornerstone for its decision by employing words commonly associated with physical violence (or a
fear thereof) 94 times in the main body of the opinion. In calculating this figure, I counted the words
'weapon(s),' 'armed,' 'danger(ous),' 'harm,' 'gun(s),' and other names for guns (e.g. 'pistol,'
'revolver'), 'safety,' 'protect(ive), (ion),' 'fear,' 'assault,' 'threat,' 'knives,' 'clubs,' and 'bullet(s).'
Words such as 'danger' or 'protection' were not counted in circumstances in which the Court used
them in a context other than that commonly associated with a threat of physical violence. For
example, the statement, "The danger in the logic which proceeds upon distinctions between a 'stop'
and an 'arrest,"' 392 U.S. at 17 (emphasis added), would not be counted in the those terms commonly
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Court described the scope of a permissible frisk as "limited to that which
is necessary for the discovery of weapons which might be used to harm
the officer or others nearby, and may realistically be characterized as
something less than a 'full' search, even though it remains a serious
intrusion."116 The Fourth Amendment, therefore, permits a limited frisk
for weapons where an officer's investigation of suspected criminal
activity leads him to suspect that the individual before him may be
armed and presently dangerous. Chief Justice Earl Warren left no
question that an investigating officer must fear for his own or others'
safety before conducting a weapons frisk.117 A reasonable, articulable
suspicion that a suspect is engaged in criminal activity, standing alone, is
not enough.
In Sibron v. New York, 118 decided the same day as Terry, the Court
began to develop limits on the weapons frisk. Sibron re-emphasized
Terry's general requirement that a reasonable fear of physical danger
must precede a frisk. "In the case of the self-protective search for
weapons, ... [the officer] must be able to point to particular facts from
which he reasonably inferred that the individual was armed and danger-
ous." 119 In Sibron, therefore, the Court reversed a conviction for
possession of narcotics where the investigating officer suggested neither
that he feared bodily harm to himself or others, nor that he searched the
suspect for self-protection to locate weapons. 120 The officer had
observed the suspect conversing with known narcotics addicts over an
eight-hour period one evening.121 At the end of the evening, he con-
fronted the suspect and told him "'you know what I'm after,"'122 to
which the suspect responded by reaching into his pocket.123 The officer
simultaneously thrust his hand into the suspect's pocket and retrieved
several glassine envelopes containing heroin. 124 The Court found the
record insufficient to determine whether the officer's initial confronta-
associated with physical violence.
116. Id. at 26.
117. Id. at 30-31.
118. 392 U.S. 40 (1968). The other companion case decided with Sibron, Peters v. New York,
never reached the issue of whether the investigating officer had properly conducted a weapons frisk
because the Court determined that the investigating officer had actually conducted a search incident to
a lawful warrantless arrest. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 66 (1968).
119. Id. at64.
120. Id. at 66.
121. Id. at 45.
122. Id.
123. Sibron, 392 U.S. at 45.
124. Id.
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tion with the suspect constituted a Fourth Amendment "seizure," 125 but
held the officer's frisk unconstitutional.126 Chief Justice Warren wrote:
"The suspect's mere act of talking with a number of known narcotics
addicts over an eight-hour period no more gives rise to reasonable fear
of life or limb on the part of the police officer than it justifies an arrest
for committing a crime." 127
Comparing the Court's approval of Officer McFadden's frisk after
approximately twelve minutes of observation in Terry with Patrolman
Anthony Martin's seizure of narcotics after eight hours of surveillance in
Sibron, Professor Wayne LaFave has suggested that the Court is reluctant
to extend "Terry to include such lesser offenses as possession of narcot-
ics." 128 The factual difference between the two cases certainly seems to
support such a theory. Terry involved the suspected plot of a potentially
violent and deadly armed robbery, whereas Sibron involved the passive
crime of possessing narcotics. Justice Harlan's comment that he saw no
need for "immediate action" in the latter case also supports this posi-
tion.129 Since Terry requires the investigating officer to determine
whether "the individual .. . is armed and presently dangerous to the
officer or to others"130 before conducting a frisk, it logically follows
that an officer may not frisk someone when he suspects a passive crime
that poses no present threat of violence. Professor LaFave further
recommends that the Court expressly limit the Terry frisk exception to
"investigation of serious offenses." 131 It is doubtful that the Court will
adopt such a limitation, given the "plain-touch" holding in
Dickerson.132
Supreme Court frisk cases decided during the decade following
Terry continued to emphasize the Court's concern for safety, while
expanding the doctrine's scope to include new scenarios. In 1971,
Justice Rehnquist's Adams v. Williams133 opinion extended the Terry
rationale to include a situation where an informant's tip, rather than the
officer's personal observation, provides the reasonable fear of danger
necessary to conduct a weapons frisk.134 Justice Rehnquist illustrated the
scene-a lone police officer patrolling an urban "high crime area" at
125. Id. at 63. For a discussion of what police conduct constitutes a "seizure" under the Fourth
Amendment, see infra text accompanying notes 144-75.
126. See Sibron, 392 U.S. at 65-66.
127. Id. at 64.
128. 3 LAFAv, supra note 31, §9.2(c) at 358.
129. Sibron, 392 U.S. at 73 (Harlan, J., concurring).
130. Terry, 392 U.S. at 24 (emphasis added).
131. 3 LAFAvE, supra note 31, §9.2(c) at 360-61.
132. 113 S. Ct. 2130,2137 (1993).
133. 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
134. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 148-49 (1972).
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2:15 a.m.-to accent the officer's sense of impending danger upon
receiving a reliable informant's tip that a shadowy figure seated in a car
parked nearby held a gun and narcotics. 135 In this situation, the Court
concluded:
[the officer] had ample reason to fear for his safety. When
Williams rolled down his window rather than complying with
the policeman's request to step out of the car so that his move-
ments could more easily be seen, the revolver allegedly at
Williams' waist became an even greater threat. Under these
circumstances the policeman's action in reaching to the spot
where the gun was thought to be hidden constituted a limited
intrusion designed to insure his safety, and we conclude that it
was reasonable. The loaded gun seized as a result of this
intrusion was therefore admissible at Williams' trial. 136
Furthermore, Justice Rehnquist continued to stress the limited nature
of a weapons frisk. "The purpose of this limited search," he said, "is
not to discover evidence of crime, but to allow the officer to pursue his
investigation without fear of violence." 137 The Court's subsequent
opinion in Pennsylvania v. Mimms 1 38 again emphasized the Court's
concern for safety as the cornerstone for its decision to include frisks
made during stops for routine traffic violations within the permissible
parameters of Terry. Under Mimms, if an automobile driver exits his
vehicle in response to an officer's request and the officer notices a bulge
under his clothing and fears that the bulge may be a weapon, the officer
may conduct a weapons frisk.13 9 Thus, although Adams and Mimms
135. Id. at 144-45, 147-48.
136. Id. at 148 (footnote omitted). Two other considerations factored into Justice Rehnquist's
conclusion. First, the information given to the officer "carried enough indicia of reliability to justify
the officer's forcible stop of Williams." Id. at 147. The officer knew the informant, the informant
conveyed the information to him personally, and the informant had provided him with information in
the past. Id. at 146. Justice Rehnquist cited a second point in a footnote-the high incidence of police
shootings (30%) that occur when a police officer approaches a suspect seated in an automobile. Id. at
148 n.3 (citing Bristow, Police Officer Shootings-A Tactical Evaluation, 54 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 93
(1963)). See also Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325 (1990) (applying similar reasoning to uphold the
investigative search and seizure of narcotics disclosed in an informant's tip).
137. Adams, 407 U.S. at 146. Justice White also quoted this language in Dickerson 111, 113 S. Ct.
2130, 2136 (1993).
138. 434 U.S. 106 (1977).
139. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 112 (1977). In Mimms, two Philadelphia police
officers stopped the suspects' automobile upon noticing that their license plate had expired. Id. at 107.
Following routine practice, one officer approached the car and requested the driver to step out and
produce his driver's license and registration. Id. When Mimms exited from the vehicle, the officer
noticed a large bulge under his jacket. Id. Fearing that the bulge might be a weapon, he frisked
Mimms and discovered a revolver and ammunition. Id. at 107, 109-10. Under these circumstances,
the Court emphasized officer safety as the "legitimate and weighty" concern that outweighed the
invasion of Mimms' personal safety, id. at 110. 111, and used Justice Rehnquist's earlier citation to
Adams v. Williams regarding the incidence of traffic stop shootings as further justification for its
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expanded the scope of situations that justify an officer's pat-down frisk,
both cases continued to emphasize potential violence to justify the
officers' search.
C. THE COURT DEFINES "SEIZURE"
Terry,140 Sibron,14 1 Adams1 42 and Mimms 143 addressed the rapidly
unfolding events of spontaneous street encounters between police
officers and individuals engaged in suspicious activity, emphasizing
potential violence as the principal justification for the officers' weapons
frisks in those cases. The Terry Court also noted that a forcible stop
constitutes a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. 144 Thus, there was
no question that Officer McFadden "seized" John Terry when he
grabbed him and spun him around immediately prior to the frisk.145
The Court did not, however, address- the question of whether Officer
McFadden's initial confrontation with the suspects constituted a Fourth
Amendment "seizure." 146 Justice Harlan, concurring in Terry and
Sibron, however, clarified that a valid stop is a prerequisite to a valid
frisk. 147 "[Tihe officer must first have constitutional grounds to insist
on an encounter, to make a forcible stop."148 Moreover, not every stop
justifies a frisk. "If the nature of the suspected offense creates no
reasonable apprehension for the officer's safety, I would not permit him
to frisk,"149 wrote Justice Harlan.
Because a valid stop must precede a frisk, it was obviously important
for the court to clearly define what circumstances would constitute a
"seizure." In Terry, Chief Justice Warren provided fertile ground for
Justice Stewart to later develop the concept of a seizure in his "free-to-
leave" doctrine when Warren remarked:
Obviously, not all personal intercourse between policemen and
citizens involves "seizures" of persons. Only when the officer,
by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some
way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a
decision under Terry guidelines. d. at 110.
140. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
141. 392 US. 40 (1968).
142. 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
143. 434 U.S. 106 (1977).
144. 392 U.S. at 17.
145. Id. at 7.
146. 392 U.S. 1.
147. Id. at 32.
148. Terry, 392 U.S. at 32 (Harlan, J., concurring).
149. Sibron, 392 U.S. at 74 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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"4seizure" has occurred. We cannot tell with any certainty
upon this record whether any such "seizure" took place here
prior to Officer McFadden's initiation of physical contact for
the purpose of searching Terry for weapons, and we thus may
assume that up to that point no intrusion upon constitutionally
protected rights had occurred.150
In Sibron, the Court similarly noted that it required evidence about
"whether Sibron accompanied Patrolman Martin outside in submission
to a show of force or authority which left him no choice, or whether he
went voluntarily in a spirit of apparent cooperation with the officer's
investigation" in order to decide whether the initial confrontation
constituted a seizure. 151 Justice Powell's majority opinion in United
States v. Brignoni-Ponce152 subsequently clarified that government
agents may briefly detain a suspect upon a reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity in order to "investigate the circumstances that provoke
suspicion."153 Drug smuggling cases beginning with United States v.
Mendenhall154 later provided the Court with its opportunity to address
the boundary between a permissible warrantless investigative stop, and
the restraint or intimidation that would amount to a seizure.
In Mendenhall, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents
stationed in the Detroit Metropolitan Airport stopped Sylvia Mendenhall
after she exhibited behavior that conformed with a "drug courier
profile," a compilation of characteristics that law enforcement officials
found to personify drug smugglers.1 55 Mendenhall accompanied the
agents, at their request, to the airport DEA office located up one flight of
stairs approximately fifty feet away from where they had stopped her.156
In the DEA office, the agents asked her for permission to search her
person and handbag, which she consented to after the officers informed
her that she had a right to refuse. 157 Mendenhall repeated her consent to
the female police officer who arrived to conduct the search, but when the
officer informed her that the search required her to remove her clothing,
Mendenhall "stated that she had a plane to catch."158 The officer then
"assured" her that if the search revealed no narcotics, "there would be
150. Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 n.16.
151. Sibron, 392 U.S. at 63.
152. 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
153. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881 (1975). Justice Powell further
commented that "any further detention or search must be based on probable cause." Id. at 882.
154. 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
155. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544,547 n.l (1980). See also, eg., Reid v. Georgia,
448 U.S. 438, 440-41 (1980) (outlining the characteristics of the drug courier profile).
156. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 548.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 549.
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no problem."159 The search then revealed narcotics and the DEA agents
arrested her. 160
All five justices in the majority found the search conducted at the
DEA office was a constitutional "consent" search, as determined in light
of "the totality of the circumstances" surrounding Mendenhall's inter-
action with the agents.161 Three of the five justices in the majority did
not reach the question of whether the initial questioning on the airport
concourse constituted a "seizure" under the Fourth Amendment
because the lower courts never addressed the issue. 162 They therefore
assumed that the officers had seized Mendenhall prior to the search, 163
but held that the seizure constituted a lawful investigative stop based
upon the officers' reasonable suspicion that the suspect was engaged in
criminal activity. 164
Concluding that the initial encounter between the agents and
Mendenhall did not constitute a "seizure," Justice Stewart articulated the
"free-to-leave" doctrine in a section of the opinion joined only by
Justice Rehnquist. The doctrine, which the entire court has now accept-
ed, 165 states: "[A] person has been 'seized' within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all of the circumstances surround-
ing the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not
free to leave." 166  (The Court subsequently defined a "reasonable
person" within the free-to-leave context as a reasonable innocent
person.)167 Factors that the Court will consider in determining whether
government agents have seized an individual include "the threatening
presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some
physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of language or
tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer's request might
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 557-58 (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, at 226-
27). Under Schneckloth, courts are to determine whether a person consented to provide information
to authorities, either by way of answering questions or consenting to a search, by assessing "the totality
of all the surrounding circumstances-both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the
interrogation." 412 U.S. at 226. Courts may consider such factors as the suspect's age, intelligence,
education, and ethnic or social background, among others, to determine whether the suspect in fact
voluntarily consented to the search. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 557-58 (opinion of Stewart, J.).
162. 446 U.S. at 560 (Powell, J. concurring).
163. Id.
164. Id. at 565-66 (Powell, J., concurring). See also Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 881-82 (holding
that border patrol officers may lawfully detain a vehicle to question its occupants about their
citizenship status where the officer reasonably suspects that the vehicle may contain illegal aliens).
165. See Florida v. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. 2382,2386 (1991); Bostick, 111 S. Ct. at 2391 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting); Michigan v. Chestemnut, 486 U.S. 567,573 (1988); Immigration and Naturalization Service
v. DelGado, 466 U.S. 210,216-17 (1984); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491,503 (1983) (plurality opinion
of White, J.).
166. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554.
167. Bostick, Ill S. Ct. at 2388.
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be compelled." 168 The rule sprouted from Terry dictum stating that an
officer "seizes" someone "[o]nly when the officer, by means of
physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the
liberty of a citizen," 169 and from Sibron's allusion to the Court's need
for evidence about the officer's coercion or the suspect's cooperation in
order to determine whether the initial encounter in that case constituted a
"seizure." 170 It also grew from the concurring opinions of Justices
White and Harlan in Terry, holding that police do not "seize" indivi-
duals by simply approaching them to ask questions, as all members of
the public may do. "There is nothing in the Constitution which prevents
a policeman from addressing questions to anyone on the streets," 171
wrote Justice White. "Absent special circumstances, the person ap-
proached may not be detained or frisked but may refuse to cooperate
and go on his way."172
To summarize, police officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment
when they approach individuals and ask routine questions, as all mem-
bers of the public may lawfully do. If, however, the officers conduct
themselves in a way that would lead a "reasonable person" to conclude
that he is not "free to leave,"'173 then the officers have effectively seized
the person for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. The officers may
briefly detain a suspect for routine questioning when they have a reason-
able, articulable suspicion that the suspect is engaged in criminal activi-
ty, 174 but "any further detention or search must be based on consent or
probable cause."175 Finally, if, during the course of their investigation,
168. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554 (opinion of Stewart, J.).
169. Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 n.16. In Mendenhall, Justice Stewart paraphrased this language to
develop the "free-to-leave" doctrine. 446 U.S. at 553 ("a person is 'seized' only when, by means of
physical force or show of authority, his freedom of movement is restrained").
170. Sibron, 392 U.S. at 63. See supra text accompanying note 151 (quoting the Court's need for
more information about whether the suspect accompanied the officer "in submission to a show of
force" or "in a spirit of apparent cooperation" in order to decide whether the initial confrontation
constituted a seizure).
171. Terry, 392 U.S. at 34 (White, J., concurring).
172. Id. Justice Harlan added that in this situation, "ordinarily the person addressed has an equal
right to ignore his interrogator and walk away." Id. at 32-33 (Harlan, J., concurring).
173. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983). In Royer, Justice White's plurality opinion found that
two detectives effectively "seized" a suspect under the Fourth Amendment when they retained his
airline ticket and driver's license and requested him to accompany them to a large storage closet for
further interrogation. Id. at 503. Under such circumstances, the agents had forcibly restrained the
suspect to the point where they had effectively arrested him. Id.
174. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 560,561 (Powell, J., concurring); Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 881-
82.
175. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 882. Exactly what length of time would constitute a "seizure"
remains a fact-sensitive question. In United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983), the Court explicitly
declined "to adopt any outside time limitation for a permissible Terry stop." Id. at 709. In any event,
Justice O'Connor found the 90-minute warrantless seizure of the suspect's luggage in Place
"unreasonable" for Fourth Amendment purposes, particularly because the police knew of the suspect's
arrival in advance and could have taken steps to minimize the intrusion upon the suspect's Fourth
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the officers reasonably fear that the individuals they are confronting are
armed and presently dangerous, they may conduct a limited pat-down
frisk of the suspects' outer clothing to discover weapons that the suspects
may use against either the officers or others.176
III. MINNESOTA V. DICKERSON, THE PLAIN-TOUCH DOCTRINE
AND RELATED ISSUES
Minnesota v. Dickerson1 77 raises many intriguing issues, some
growing from the narrow facts of the case itself, others growing from the
theoretical underpinnings of the "plain-touch" concept. As noted
earlier, Justice White did not address the questions of whether the investi-
gating officers had a reasonable suspicion that Timothy Dickerson was
engaged in criminal activity when they forcibly stopped him, or whether
they reasonably feared he was armed and dangerous when they frisked
him. In applying the plain-view doctrine to touch, the Court also failed
to explain what "lawful right of access" will permit a police officer to
reach into a suspect's clothing and seize a nonthreatening object discov-
ered during a frisk.
After stating the facts of the case, I will explore these issues below. I
explain what "lawful right of access" will permit a police officer to
reach into a suspect's clothing and seize nonthreatening contraband
during a weapons frisk. This explanation will complete the definitional
framework of the plain-touch doctrine. I also briefly explore the
theoretical question of whether the sense of touch is sufficiently quick
and reliable to provide an officer with probable cause during a Terry
frisk. I conclude that any definitive statement on this issue must await
further scientific research. For the present, a trial court must evaluate the
credibility of an officer's testimony to determine whether a non-
threatening object's incriminating nature was "immediately apparent" to
the officer upon touching it. Finally, Part IV examines whether
Amendment rights. Id. at 710. Cases decided since Place confirm the fact-sensitive nature of this
issue. In United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531 (1985), customs officials detained a
traveler who arrived at Los Angeles International Airport from Bogota, Colombia, on suspicion that
she was smuggling narcotics through her alimentary canal. Id. at 533-34. The Court upheld her
detention for nearly 27 hours while the agents waited for her to either produce a bowel movement or
agree to another form of inspection, such as an X-Ray examination. Id. at 544. Justice Rehnquist
reasoned that her "long, uncomfortable, indeed, humiliating" detention had "resulted solely from the
method by which she chose to smuggle illicit drugs into this country." Id. Justice Rehnquist analogized
the case to a situation where border officials detain a suspected tuberculosis carrier: "both are
detained until their bodily processes dispel the suspicion that they will introduce a harmful agent into
this country." Id. See also United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675,687-88 (1985) (holding a 20-minute
detention while an officer attempted to contact other officers reasonable, because the officer acted as
expeditiously as possible during his investigation).
176. Terry, 392 U.S. at 30-31.
177. 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993).
[VOL. 71:211236
1995] MINNESOTA V. DICKERSON
Dickerson's behavior justified his stop and the frisk that Officer Rose
immediately performed. I conclude that the officers were unjustified in
taking either action.
A. MINNESOTA V. DICKERSON
At approximately 8:15 p.m. on the evening of November 9, 1989,
two uniformed police officers, Vernon Rose and Bruce Johnson, were
patrolling the area of Tenth Avenue and Morgan Avenue on the north
side of Minneapolis, Minnesota. 178 As they proceeded southbound on
Morgan Avenue in their marked squad car, they observed an individual
exit building number 1030, a twelve-unit apartment house. 179 The
apartment house had a front set of concrete steps connected with a
sidewalk that wrapped around the building and led directly to an alley
located behind the building. 180 Another sidewalk connected the first
sidewalk with a third sidewalk running parallel with Morgan Avenue.'18
In order to reach Morgan Avenue, therefore, an individual descending
the front staircase of 1030 Morgan Avenue would have to cross over the
first sidewalk, walk along the second sidewalk, and pass through a gate
leading to the public sidewalk running parallel with Morgan Avenue.18 2
178. Id. at 2133.
179. Id.; Transcript at 7-8. Dickerson (No. 89067687).
180. Transcript at 12-13.
181. Telephone Interview with Beverly J. Wolfe, Esq., Assistant Hennepin County Attorney,
Sept. 7, 1993.
182. I have developed this illustration of the scene primarily from Officer Rose's sworn
testimony, which the Minnesota courts credited as an accurate portrayal of the events leading up to the
suspect's arrest:
[Cross-examination by Mary Moriarty, Esq., Assistant Public Defender]
Q. Officer Rose, you said that Mr. Dickerson walked down the steps.
A. Correct. There's front steps, concrete steps.
Q. And you said when he got to the bottom of the steps he changed direction?
A. No. I didn't. I said when he got to the bottom he started towards the concrete,
towards the sidewalk. He was almost out the gate, saw us, turned around and went the
other way.
Q. Did you notice there was a sidewalk which goes to the side of that house into the
alley?
A. Did I notice if there's one?
Q. Yes.
A. Absolutely.
Q. And how far away from the concrete steps would you say that sidewalk is?
A. From the concrete steps, probably runs right to it, I would think.
He was past that about probably three to five feet Id guess before he - when he saw us
and turned around and went back.
Transcript at 12-13, Dickerson (No. 89067687). Earlier, on direct examination, Officer Rose testified
"he [Dickerson] was headed towards the sidewalk. He looked up and saw the squad coming by and
turned around and changed his direction and headed along the south side of the building out towards
the alley." Id. at 8.
Beverly Wolfe, Esq.. an assistant prosecutor for Hennepin County, informed me that another
sidewalk connected the public sidewalk on Morgan Avenue with the sidewalk running from the
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The officers observed the individual, a black male unknown to
them, exit the front door of the apartment house, descend the staircase,
and begin walking toward Morgan Avenue. 183 The individual was
approximately three to five feet beyond the first sidewalk,184 near the
gate leading to the Morgan Avenue sidewalk,1 85 when he looked up,
made eye contact with Officer Rose, and abruptly turned and walked
along the south side of the building into the alley.186 Officer Johnson,
driving, circled the squad car around so that it entered the alley from a
direction facing the suspect,187 who continued to walk toward the squad
car. 188 When the officers stopped the individual, they immediately
ordered him to place his hands on the hood of the squad car. 189 The
moment he complied with this command, Officer Rose frisked him.190
On direct examination by the prosecuting attorney, Officer Rose
described the stop and the frisk as follows:
A. Officer Johnson pulled the squad into the alley and we
stopped the party.
Q. Why did you stop that individual?
A. To check him for weapons and contraband.
Q. Now, what did you do after you made the stop?
A. I pat-searched the party for weapons and contraband.
Q. Why were you pat-searching for weapons?
A. Because we've had numerous weapons in that area found.
Q. Describe how you conducted the search then.
A. I started down from the shoulders to the underarms. I then
went across the waistband and I came back up to the chest and
I hit a nylon jacket that had a pocket and the nylon jacket was
very fine nylon and as I pat-searched the front of his body I
felt a lump, a small lump, in the front pocket. I examined it
with my fingers and it slid and it felt to be a lump of crack
cocaine in cellophane.
It was in... a sandwich-wrap type material with a knot tied on
it. You could feel the knot through the nylon also.191
apartment steps to the alley. Telephone Interview with Beverly Wolfe, Esq., supra note 181. I
incorporated this information into my illustration of the scene. Ms. Wolfe otherwise confirmed the
description that I have provided in the text. See id.
183. Transcript at 8, Dickerson (No. 89067687).
184. Id. at 13.
185. Id. at 12.
186. Id. at 8.
187. Id. at 9.
188. Transcript at 16-17, Dickerson (No. 89067687).
189. Id. at 19.
190. Id. at 9, 19.
191. Id. at 9-10.
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Officer Rose then removed the .2 gram lump of crack cocaine,192
which was approximately the size of an aspirin tablet,193 and arrested the
suspect. 194
The above fact pattern is drawn primarily from Officer Rose's sworn
testimony at the evidentiary hearing on February 20, 1990, which the
trial court judge credited as a reliable account of the events on the
evening of November 9, 1989.195 Officer Rose further testified that he
considered 1030 Morgan Avenue a 24-hour-a-day "crack house"
where he had executed search warrants and responded to complaints of
drug dealing in the hallways,1 96 although he and Officer Johnson had
not responded to a call on this particular occasion. 197 His previous
searches had recovered weapons and narcotics, including knives, sawed-
off shotguns, handguns, and crack cocaine. 198 At the time of the eviden-
tiary hearing, Officer Rose was a veteran of fourteen years, and had
patrolled the north side of Minneapolis for over eleven years. 199 He had
executed approximately seventy-five crack and cocaine search warrants
over the two years prior to arresting Mr. Dickerson.200 He had also
recovered crack cocaine approximately seventy-five to 100 times during
arrests and searches over the previous two years.201 He could not,
however, recall how many search warrants he had executed at 1030
Morgan Avenue, or which of the twelve apartments he had executed
192. Id. at 9.
193. Respondent's Brief in Opposition to Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at xii, Minnesota v.
Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993) (No. 91-2019). I have accepted the description of the .2 gram lump
of crack cocaine as the size of an average aspirin tablet because neither the Petitioner State of
Minnesota nor Justice White disputed the description. In Respondent's Brief, Dickerson suggested that
the Supreme Court should take judicial notice of this fact. Id. (citing FED. R. EVID. 201(b)).
Justice Tomijanovich's statement that "[tihe confiscated material was described as the size of a
pea or a marble," Dickerson 1I, 481 N.W.2d at 843 (Minn. 1992), is misleading because this
description appeared only in the public defender's oral argument during the suppression motion.
Another more serious factual inaccuracy in the Minnesota Supreme Court opinion appears where the
court cites the trial court finding that Officer Rose immediately knew the lump in Dickerson's pocket
was crack cocaine. Id. at 844. The trial court never made such a finding. Trial Judge Robert H.
Lynn, rather, found Officer Rose's conduct in frisking Dickerson and seizing the crack cocaine
"reasonable" under the Fourth Amendment. Trial Court Findings at C-3, C-5 to 6, Dickerson (No. 91-
2019). Officer Rose, moreover, never testified that he "immediately" knew the object in Dickerson's
pocket was crack cocaine. He merely testified that he was "absolutely certain" the object was crack
after manipulating it within the thin nylon pocket of Dickerson's jacket. Transcript at 9-10, Dickerson
(No. 89067687).
194. Transcript at 9, Dickerson (No. 89067687).
195. Trial Court Findings at C-3, C-4 to 5, Dickerson (91-2019), Dickerson I1, 481 N.W.2d 840,
843 (Minn. App. 1992); Dickerson 1, 469 N.W.2d 462,465 (Minn. App. 1991).
196. Transcript at 7, 14, Dickerson (No. 89067687).
197. Id. at 15.
198. Id. at 7.
199. Id. at 4.
200. Id. at 5.
201. Transcript at 5, Dickerson (No. 89067687).
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warrants in.20 2 Officer Rose estimated that he had "done a couple of
doubles,"203 meaning four of the twelve apartments.
The defendant moved to dismiss the charges on the grounds that
officers Rose and Johnson violated the requirements of a valid investi-
gative stop and a weapons frisk.204 The trial court denied the motion,
concluding that Officer Rose acted reasonably in stopping Dickerson
and frisking him for weapons. 20 5 The court equated Officer Rose's
tactile discovery of the contraband with a similar discovery under the
plain-view doctrine, and upheld its seizure. 206 The state appellate courts
affirmed the trial court's decision to credit the officer's testimony over
Dickerson's testimony. 207 The appellate courts also affirmed the trial
court's conclusion that the officers had a reasonable, articulable suspi-
cion that Dickerson was engaged in criminal activity, and that
Dickerson's suspicious behavior, combined with the officers' knowledge
of the surrounding area, constituted a sufficient basis for the officers'
belief that he was armed and dangerous.208 For these reasons, both the
Minnesota Court of Appeals and the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed
the trial court's opinion that the officers were justified in stopping
Dickerson and frisking him.20 9 Respondent Dickerson did not question
these findings on the state's appeal to the United States Supreme
Court. 2 10
The Minnesota Court of Appeals, however, reversed the trial court's
denial of Dickerson's suppression motion.211 The Minnesota Supreme
Court affirmed, holding that Officer Rose exceeded the scope of Terry
by continuing to manipulate the object in Dickerson's pocket after he
had determined that Dickerson possessed no weapons. 2 12 Though
acknowledging that an improper motive does not necessarily invalidate a
search and seizure, 2 13 Justice Tomljanovich also found Officer Rose's
202. Id. at 22.
203. Id.
204. Notice of Motion and Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Probable Cause, reprinted in Joint
Appendix at 12-16, Minnesota v. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993) (No. 91-2019). Dickerson argued
that the violation of his Fourth Amendment rights required the court to suppress the evidence. Id.
Without the evidence, no probable cause would have existed to charge him. Id. at 13, 16.
205. Trial Court Findings at C-3, C-4 to 5, Dickerson (No. 91-2019). Judge Lynn believed that
Dickerson's behavior and his presence in an area known for weapons seizures supported both a
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity necessary to stop him and a concern for safety necessary to
frisk him. Id. at C-4 to 5.
206. Id. at C-5.
207. Dickerson I1, 481 N.W.2d at 843; Dickerson 1, 469 N.W.2d at 464-65.
208. Dickerson I1, 481 N.W.2d at 843; Dickerson 1, 469 N.W.2d at 465.
209. Dickerson II, 481 N.W.2d at 843; Dickerson 1, 469 N.W.2d at 465.
210. Dickerson III, 113 S. Ct. at 2138.
211. Dickerson 1, 469 N.W.2d at 466.
212. Dickerson I, 481 N.W.2d at 844.
213. Id. (citing Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128. 139 (1990)).
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testimony that he stopped Dickerson to search him for weapons and
contraband indicated his intention to subvert the scope of a Terry
frisk.214
Both Minnesota appellate courts refused to recognize a plain-touch
doctrine, 215 and, therefore, also reversed the trial court's decision recog-
nizing it.216 In arriving at this conclusion, the Minnesota Supreme Court
first found the sense of touch "less immediate and less reliable" than
sight. 217 Second, the court reasoned that discovering an object through
touch is so inherently more intrusive than simply viewing an object that
such action actually constitutes a search in itself, separate from anything
Terry justifies.218 "It is one thing to see a bag of marijuana in a suspect's
pocket," wrote Justice Tomljanovich. "It is quite something else to
pinch, squeeze and rub the suspect's pocket to see what might be inside.
Observing something that is held out to plain view is not a search at all.
Physically touching a person cannot be considered anything but a
search." 219 Even if the court adopted a plain-touch doctrine, she added,
the officer's behavior during the frisk exceeded its scope because he
could not recognize the object as contraband without continuing to
manipulate it.220 Although both appellate courts deferred to the trial
court's factual findings, Justice Tomljanovich questioned the trial court's
finding that Officer Rose properly conducted the Terry frisk when he
recognized the object in Dickerson's pocket as crack cocaine, and held
that the frisk exceeded the scope of a permissible frisk for weapons.221
214. Id.
[T]he officer's testimony that he intended to conduct a warrantless search for drugs,
combined with his testimony about squeezing, sliding and otherwise manipulating the
contents of the defendant's pocket, convince us that he set out to flaunt the limitations of
Terry and he succeeded. The results of such a search cannot be admitted into evidence.
Id.
215. Dickerson I, 481 N.W.2d at 844,845; Dickerson 1, 469 N.W.2d at 466.
216. Dickerson HI, 481 N.W.2d at 843-45; Dickerson 1, 469 N.W.2d at 466-67. In upholding
Officer Rose's search of Dickerson for weapons and contraband, and his seizure of the crack
cocaine, District Court Judge Robert H. Lynn wrote:
To this Court, there is no distinction as to which sensory perception the officer uses to
conclude that he material is contraband. An experienced officer may rely upon his
sense of smell in DWI stops or in recognizing the smell of burning marijuana in a
automobile. The sound of a shotgun being racked would clearly support certain
reactions by an officer. The sense of touch, grounded in experience and training, is as
reliable as perceptions drawn from other senses. "Plain feel," therefore, is no different
than plain view and will equally support the seizure here.
Trial Court Findings at C-5, Dickerson (91-2019).
217. Dickerson H, 481 N.W.2d at 845.
218. Id.
219. Id. (footnotes omitted).
220. Id. at 844 n.l.
221. Id. at 843.
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[A] close examination of the record in this case reveals that ...
the officer's 'immediate' discovery in this case is fiction, not
fact.
The officer testified that he was sure he had found crack
cocaine only after (1) feeling a lump, (2) manipulating it with
his fingers, and (3) sliding it within the defendant's pocket.
That testimony belies any notion that he 'immediately' knew
what he had found. And this was not a case of some clever
cross-examiner putting words in the officer's mouth; this was
his own testimony on direct examination. 222
As a final justification for her holding, Justice Tomljanovich noted
that "plain touch" was "not a 'well-delineated' exception to the
[F]ourth [A]mendment." 223
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, Justice White held
that the Fourth Amendment permits police officers to seize non-
threatening contraband discovered through the sense of touch during a
weapons frisk, so long as the officers confine their search to the limits
outlined in Terry, and provided that the object's incriminating nature is
"immediately apparent." 224 In reaching this conclusion, Justice White
disagreed with the Minnesota Supreme Court's reasoning that the sense
of touch is less reliable than sight, and that discovering objects through
touch is more intrusive than doing so through sight.
First, Terry itself demonstrates that the sense of touch is capable
of revealing the nature of an object with sufficient reliability to
support a seizure. The very premise of Terry, after all, is that
officers will be able to detect the presence of weapons through
the sense of touch. . . . Even if it were true that the sense of
touch is generally less reliable than the sense of sight, that only
suggests that officers will less often be able to justify seizures
of unseen contraband. 225
Second, the Court refuted Justice Tomljanovich's concern about the
intrusiveness of discovering contraband through touch, reasoning that
Terry already permits the police to initiate physical contact in order to
222. Dickerson H, 481 N.W.2d at 844. The Minnesota Supreme Court stated that "[tihe trial
court found that when the officer felt the defendant's jacket pocket, he knew immediately he was
feeling a plastic bag containing a lump of crack cocaine." Id. Such a "finding," however, appears
nowhere in either the trial court's unpublished findings of fact and law, or the trial court transcript.
See supra note 193.
223. Dickerson 11, 481 N.W.2d at 846.
224. Dickerson II1, 113 S. Ct. at 2137.
225. Id.
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search for weapons. 226 Discovering and seizing contraband during the
course of a frisk, therefore, "occasions no further invasion of privacy"
than that already authorized under Terry.227 For these reasons, Justice
White expressly disapproved of that part of the Minnesota decision
which seemed to categorically bar the seizure of contraband detected
through the sense of touch because such a rule would not advance the
privacy interests guarded by the Fourth Amendment. 228
Justice White limited the Court's unanimous plain-touch holding to
those situations where the issue arises during a weapons frisk, as indicat-
ed in both his statement of the issue,229 and in this synopsis of the new
rule:
If a police officer lawfully pats down a suspect's outer clothing
and feels an object whose contour or mass makes its identity
immediately apparent, there has been no invasion of the
suspect's privacy beyond that already authorized by the
officer's search for weapons; if the object is contraband, its
warrantless seizure would be justified by the same practical
considerations that inhere in the plain view context. 230
The new plain-touch doctrine, therefore, encompasses all the
requirements of the plain-view doctrine as applied to an officer's tactile
impressions during a properly limited weapons frisk.
Applying the plain-view doctrine to the Dickerson facts, Justice
White accepted the Minnesota courts' findings that the police were
justified in stopping Dickerson and frisking him,231 and restricted the
Court's analysis to the issue of whether Officer Rose acted within the
scope of Terry232 and the plain-view doctrine 233 when he developed
probable cause to believe the lump in Dickerson's pocket was crack
cocaine. Affirming the judgment of the Minnesota Supreme Court,
Justice White concluded that "the officer's continued exploration of
respondent's pocket after having concluded that it contained no weapon
was unrelated to '[t]he sole justification of the search [under Terry:] ...
the protection of the police officer and others nearby."' 234 For this
226. Id. at 2138.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. See Dickerson 111, 113 S. Ct. at 2133, 2136 ("[iln this case, we consider whether the Fourth
Amendment permits the seizure of contraband detected through a police officer's sense of touch
during a protective patdown search").
230. Id. at 2137.
231. Id. at 2138.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 2139.
234. Dickerson 11I, 113 S. Ct. at 2138-39 (brackets in original) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 26).
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reason, the frisk constituted an impermissible general evidentiary search
that breached the limits of a Terry frisk. 235 Applying the plain-touch
doctrine, Justice White equated Officer Rose's conduct with that of the
officer lifting the stereo equipment in Arizona v. Hicks.236 As in Hicks,
Officer Rose's act of squeezing, sliding, and otherwise manipulating the
lump in Dickerson's pocket constituted "a further search, one not
authorized by Terry or by any other exception to the Warrant Require-
ment. Because this further search of respondent's pocket was constitu-
tionally invalid, the seizure of the cocaine that followed is likewise
unconstitutional ."237
As stated by Justice White, the Minnesota v. Dickerson plain-touch
doctrine may be summarized as follows: First, a police officer must be
properly justified in conducting an investigative stop and a limited
weapons frisk. Second, the police officer must satisfy the three require-
ments of the plain-view doctrine, as applied in the context of "plain
touch": (1) a reasonable, articulable fear that the suspect is armed and
presently dangerous will justify a pat-down frisk, which will, in turn,
place the officer lawfully in a position where he may tactually sense the
presence of contraband; (2) if the officer feels a nonthreatening object
during the frisk, the object's incriminating nature must be immediately
apparent (the officer's initial sense impressions alone, without doing
more, must create probable cause to believe that the object is contraband
or incriminating evidence); and (3) if the officer has satisfied steps (1)
and (2), he may seize the object if he has a lawful right of access to the
object.
Unfortunately, the Dickerson plain-touch framework is incomplete.
What is the "lawful right of access" that will allow a police officer to
reach into someone's clothing and seize a nonthreatening object?
B. THE COMPLETE PLAIN-ToUCH DocTRINE
Although Justice White correctly outlined the three requirements of
the plain-view doctrine238 in Minnesota v. Dickerson, he did not describe
precisely what "lawful right of access" will permit a police officer to
reach into a suspect's clothing and seize a nonthreatening object during a
235. Id.
236. Cf. 480 U.S. 321 (1987). The reader should note that Timothy Dickerson's appellate counsel
made this precise argument in his brief to the Court. See Respondent's Brief on the Merits at 32-34,
Minnesota v. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993) (No. 91-2019). For a discussion of Hicks, see supra
text accompanying notes 59-69.
237. Dickerson II1, 113 S. Ct. at 2139.
238. Id. at 2136-37 ("uinder that doctrine, if the police are lawfully in a position from which
they view an object, if its incriminating character is immediately apparent, and if the officers have a
lawful right of access to the object, they may seize it without a warrant").
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weapons frisk. Justice White later said that the Fourth Amendment
requires a police officer to "have probable cause to believe that the item
is contraband before seizing it,"239 but this statement is somewhat
misleading. As Justice Stewart wrote in Coolidge v. New Hampshire,240
"no amount of probable cause can justify a warrantless . . . seizure
absent 'exigent circumstances."' 241 Because "plain view alone is never
enough to justify a warrantless seizure of evidence," 242 it follows that
plain touch, alone, is never enough to justify the seizure of a non-
threatening object concealed within the clothing of a suspect. Justice
White should, therefore, have taken one last technical but important step
in his analysis to explain why a police officer may seize nonthreatening
contraband whose incriminating nature is immediately apparent through
the sense of touch.243
The search-incident-to-arrest exception to the Warrant Requirement
logically fills this gap in the last step of the plain-touch analysis. Courts
have long held that a police officer may make a warrantless arrest when
239. Id. at 2137. See also supra notes 59-69 and accompanying text (discussing Arizona v.
Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987) (holding that a police officer must have probable cause to believe that an
object is contraband or evidence of a crime in order to seize it under the plain-view doctrine but
referring to a situation where the officer already had a lawful right of access to the object because he
was conducting a warrantless search, inside the suspect's apartment, justified by exigent
circumstances)).
240. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
241. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,468 (1971). See also supra text accompanying
note 45.
242. 403 U.S. at 468. See also supra text accompanying note 45.
243. See Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983) (skipping the last step in the plain view analysis by
failing to explain what "lawful right of access" the investigating police officer had to seize the
suspected contraband at issue in that case). In Brown, an investigating police officer standing outside
the driver's window of an automobile observed evidence of illicit narcotics located inside during a
routine driver's license check. Id. at 733. When the driver failed to produce his license, the officer
ordered him to exit the vehicle and seized the evidence (a party balloon containing heroin)
immediately after the suspect left the car. Id. at 733-34. Justice Rehnquist correctly stated the rule
that an officer may seize evidence of a crime discovered in plain view on private premises when the
"officer's access to the object has some prior justification under the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 738.
He noted that such access would include an officer's observations made while executing a search
warrant, or an officer's action taken pursuant to an exception to the Warrant Requirement. Id. at 738
n.4.
Despite correctly reciting this last step in the plain-view doctrine, Justice Rehnquist applied only
the first two steps of the plain-view doctrine. He first found that the officer properly observed the
contraband located in the suspect's car. Id. at 739-40. Second, he found that the nature of the
evidence as illegal contraband was "immediately apparent" to the officer. Id. at 743. He then simply
concluded that these factors gave the officer probable cause to believe that the evidence "was subject
to seizure under the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 744. As explained infra at text accompanying notes
244 through 251, Justice Rehnquist should have completed his Brown analysis by finding (A) that the
officer's observations gave him probable cause to believe that the suspect was committing a crime in
his presence-possession of narcotics, and (B) that this probable cause entitled the officer to arrest the
suspect and seize the evidence in a search incident to arrest. An alternative ground for upholding the
seizure would have been to hold that the officer seized the evidence in search incident to arrest of the
suspect for driving without a license. Justice Rehnquist noted that the precise ground for the suspect's
ultimate arrest was unclear from the record before the Court. Id. at 738 n.4.
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he has probable cause to believe that a suspect is committing a crime in
his presence. 244 The officer may employ all his senses, including touch,
to develop probable cause to believe that the suspect is committing a
crime.245 Finally, it is well settled that a police officer may conduct a full
search of an arrestee incident to a lawful arrest.246 As noted in United
States v. Robinson,247 a police officer may seize evidence discovered on
the arrestee's person during the course of a full search incident to
arrest.248
Examining a hypothetical fact pattern similar to Dickerson in light
of these additional considerations illustrates a properly executed plain-
touch seizure during a weapons frisk. Assume that the officer is lawfully
justified under Terry in stopping the suspect and then frisking him.
During the frisk, the officer discovers a nonthreatening object. Unlike
Officer Rose, the police officer does not manipulate the object, but
244. Justice Marshall concisely summarized this rule in United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411
(1976): "When law enforcement officers have probable cause to believe that an offense is taking
place in their presence, and that the suspect is at that moment in possession of the evidence, exigent
circumstances exist. Delay could cause the escape of the suspect or the destruction of the evidence."
423 U.S. at 435 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See also 2 LAFAvE, supra note 31, §§ 5.1(b) & (c) at 395-
411 (discussing the parameters of lawful warrantless arrests for both felonies and misdemeanors).
This rule holds true regardless of whether the crime is a felony or a misdemeanor under the
jurisdiction's criminal code. 2 LAFAVE, supra note 31, § 5.1(b) at 395-96 & n.69 (Supp. 1994)
(discussing the common law and statutory requirements regarding warrantless arrests for felonies and
misdemeanors). A police officer may also make a warrantless arrest if he has probable cause to
believe that a felony has been committed, and that the person before him has committed it. 2 LAFAVE,
supra note 31, § 5.1(b) at 395. See also, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 15 (1948) (stating,
in dicta, that a warrantless arrest "could be valid only if for a crime committed in the presence of the
arresting officer or for a felony of which he had reasonable cause to believe the defendant guilty").
245. 2 LAFAVE, supra note 31, § 5.1(c) at 405-06 ("It is generally accepted that an officer 'may
utilize all of his senses' in determining whether a misdemeanor is occurring"). In State v. Washington,
396 N.W.2d 156 (Wis. 1986), a police officer stopped a station wagon whose license plates matched
those of a station wagon used in a recent jewelry heist. Id. at 158. The officer ordered the car's two
occupants to exit the vehicle and place their hands on top of the car so that he could frisk them for
weapons. Id. While frisking one suspect, the officer felt three watches. Id. The court held that the
police officer's suspicion that the individual was involved in a recent jewelry store robbery, combined
with the fact that it is unusual for someone to have three watches, gave the officer probable cause to
believe that the suspect had committed the crime. Id. at 162. When the officer seized the watches, he
discovered that the watches still had tags identifying them as property of the jewelry store. Id. See
also State v. Guy, 492 N.W.2d 311, 317-18 (Wis. 1992) (identifying soft bags containing cocaine
during frisk of suspect); United States v. Pace, 709 F. Supp. 948, 956-57 (C.D. Cal. 1989) (finding that
DEA agent acted in accordance with the plain-view doctrine and the search-incident-to-arrest
exception when he immediately identified bricks of cocaine on the suspect's back during a pat-down
frisk); State v. Chester, 129 A. 596, 599 (1925) (holding that the suspect committed a crime in the
police officer's "view" where the officer arrested the suspect after feeling a bottle of illicit liquor in
the suspect's breast pocket).
The rule that an officer need not see the offense in order for a court to consider it committed in
the officer's presence dates back at least 100 years. See State v. McAfee, 12 S.E. 435, 437 (1890)
(holding that the offense was committed in the officer's "presence" in a circumstance in which he
heard the sound of a blow delivered upon the victim) (discussed supra at text accompanying notes 81-
83).
246. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218,224,235 (1973).
247. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
248. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218,224-35 (1973).
246
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recognizes it as illicit contraband immediately upon touching it. This
tactile identification gives the officer probable cause to believe that the
suspect is committing a crime-possession of narcotics. Probable cause
to make a warrantless arrest then replaces the reasonable suspicion that
justified the investigative stop and the fear of violence that justified the
limited frisk. The officer's lawful right of access' to the object, therefore,
is that which accompanies a search incident to arrest. The officer may
then seize the object as part of a search incident to a lawful arrest.249
Filling in the last step of the plain-touch doctrine with the search-
incident-to-arrest exception provides the following complete statement
of the plain-touch doctrine applied to a weapons frisk: To initially
detain a suspect for further investigation, an officer must have a reason-
able, articulable suspicion that the suspect is engaged in criminal activi-
ty.250 The officer must also reasonably fear that the suspect may be
armed and presently dangerous in order to conduct a limited pat-down
frisk for weapons. Terry, therefore, places the officer lawfully in a
position to feel any potentially incriminating object. When the officer
feels an object that he immediately recognizes as contraband, without
expanding the scope of the Terry frisk, this sensation raises his level of
suspicion to probable cause to arrest the suspect for committing a crime.
The officer may then arrest the suspect and seize the contraband under
the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the Warrant Requirement. 251
249. E.g., id. at 235. A search may also be incident to an arrest even if the search occurred
immediately before the arrest. Id. Probable cause to arrest, however, must exist independently from
the fruits of the search. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 110-11 & n.6 (1980). The rule that
probable cause to arrest must exist independently from the fruits of the search is consistent with the
premise that an officer may develop probable cause to arrest via a Terry frisk. Remember, a Terry
frisk is less than a full search. If, during a Terry frisk, the officer develops probable cause to believe
that the suspect is committing an offense, he may arrest the suspect and conduct a more extensive
search incident to arrest. Thus, probable cause to arrest precedes the full search. It is the full search
incident to arrest that enables the officer to seize contraband, not the limited Terry frisk. During a
plain touch encounter, the full search will necessarily follow the Terry frisk. The Rawlings rule,
therefore, does not apply to the plain-touch doctrine.
250. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881 (1975). See also United States v.
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 560 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring).
25 1. Professor LaFave briefly touches upon this concept, but takes a different approach. LaFave
argues that there is no need to address a plain-touch issue if an officer develops probable cause to
believe that the suspect possesses contraband because probable cause would entitle the officer to
arrest the suspect and conduct an incidental search. I LAFAvE, supra note 31, § 2.2 at 65 and n.30.12
(Supp. 1994). As discussed in the text, however, the concept is necessary because the touching is
what gave the officer probable cause in the first place. Id. Without touching the suspect's clothing,
the officer could not have probable cause to arrest the suspect. The Terry frisk provides the officer
with a lawful vantage point to feel incriminating evidence; the warrantless arrest and the incidental
search provide the lawful right of access to the object under the plain-touch doctrine. A complete
plain-touch doctrine is also important in order to provide a framework to follow when the "plain
touch" occurs in a situation other than a weapons frisk, as discussed infra at text accompanying notes
263-64.
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
Although explaining precisely what exception to the Warrant
Requirement will permit a police officer to seize contraband discovered
through plain touch may seem like an exercise in semantics, this techni-
cal step is nevertheless important. First, Terry permits a frisk for weap-
ons only.252 As Justice Rehnquist said in Adams v. Williams,253 "[tihe
purpose of this limited search is not to discover evidence of crime, but to
allow the officer to pursue his investigation without fear of violence." 254
A situation where police officers discover evidence of a crime during a
Terry frisk is not like the situations presented in Hicks255 and Horton ,256
where officers were authorized to enter premises to search for and seize
evidence.257 A situation where a police officer feels nonthreatening
contraband during a Terry frisk is more like that of Johnson v. United
States, 258 where officers could smell an incriminating odor coming from
the suspect's hotel room.259 If the odor supported probable cause, the
officers could not simply enter the hotel room and conduct a warrantless
search and seizure. 260 Rather, they needed either a warrant or an appli-
cable exception to the Warrant Requirement authorizing them to enter
the room. 261 Similarly, a police officer may not enter someone's home
without a warrant simply because he heard a nonthreatening incriminat-
ing noise, or because he saw a nonthreatening incriminating object (as
occurred in People v. Pakula).262 In all cases-seeing, hearing, smelling,
and touching, the officer must have a warrant or an applicable exception
to the Warrant Requirement to justify further intrusive action. Clothing
shields an individual's personal effects from outside scrutiny just as
effectively as the walls of a house, apartment, or hotel room. Police
252. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,24 (1968).
253. 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
254. Id. at 146 (emphasis added). Justice White quoted this language with approval in Dickerson
III, 113 S. Ct. at 2136. See also Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 93-94 (1979) (finding that "[n]othing in
Terry can be understood to allow... any search whatever for anything but weapons").
255. 480 U.S. 321 (1987).
256. 496 U.S. 128 (1990).
257. See Hicks, 480 U.S. at 324 (finding exigent circumstances authorized officers to enter the
suspect's apartment to search for and seize evidence of the shooting). Exigent circumstances also
placed the officers lawfully in a position where they observed other objects, which they could have
seized if they immediately developed probable cause to believe that those objects were evidence of a
crime. Id. at 326. See also Horton, 496 U.S. at 130-31 (finding that a search warrant authorized the
investigating officer to enter the suspect's home to search for and seize proceeds of the robbery). The
warrant also placed the officer lawfully in a position where he could observe other incriminating
objects not specified in the warrant, which he properly seized when he immediately recognized them
as evidence of the crime. Id. at 142.
258. 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
259. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 12 (1948).
260. Id. at 13-15.
261. Id. at 14-15.
262. 411 NE.2d 1385 (111. App. Ct. 1980). See supra text accompanying notes 70-80 (discussing
Pakula).
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entry into the private areas concealed on one's own body, therefore,
requires, at the very least, the same justifications as for entry into
someone's home.
Finally, precisely defining the plain-touch doctrine is important to
provide courts and the law enforcement community with step-by-step
guidelines to determine whether a seizure is authorized in all plain-touch
situations, including those arising outside the realm of a weapons frisk.
For example, if an officer feels the exterior of a sealed bag and immedi-
ately determines that it contains evidence of a crime, what lawful right of
access would permit him to reach into the bag? 263 Or, if a shipping
inspector must climb over certain cargo in order to reach a destination
inside a ship and, in the course of doing so, feels the unmistakable
outline of contraband concealed beneath a tarpaulin, what lawful right of
access would allow him to seize the contraband? 264 Thus, in all plain-
touch situations, the officer must (1) be lawfully in a position to feel an
object concealed within an outer layer, whether the outer layer is cloth-
ing, paper, plastic, or some other material; (2) immediately recognize the
object as contraband or evidence of a crime; and (3) have a lawful right
of access to the object either by virtue of a warrant or an applicable
exception to the Warrant Requirement. If all three conditions are
satisfied, the officer may seize the object under the plain-touch doctrine.
C. Is THE SENSE OF TOUCH SUFFICIENTLY ACCURATE TO PROVIDE AN
INVESTIGATING POLICE OFFICER WITH PROBABLE CAUSE?
Imagine yourself at a parking meter. The meter requires quarters.
You reach into your pocket, without looking, and sort through the
jumbled assortment of nickels, dimes, quarters, and pennies until you
extract a quarter for the meter. This process takes a matter of seconds,
and you probably do not consciously consider your actions. Given the
hundreds of opportunities that experienced police officers patrolling the
streets of our nation's urban high-crime areas have to feel the texture of
illicit narcotics and the containers concealing these substances, 265 the
263. See United States v. Ocampo, 650 F.d 421,425,429 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding that when an
officer reached into the suspect's car after arresting the suspect, and felt the outside of a sealed paper
bag that he readily determined to contain wrapped currency, the suspect could not "reasonably expect
any substantial degree of privacy" in the bag's contents because the contents were "easily discernable
by frisking the exterior").
264. Cf. United States v. Norman, 701 F.2d 295 (4th Cir. 1983). In Norman, a Coast Guard
officer, inspecting a suspicious vessel, climbed over various bales in order to reach the ship's
pilothouse and was able to see, smell, and feel the bales. 701 F.2d at 296-98. Upholding the seizure of
marijuana concealed within the bales, the court wrote: "plain view encompasses more than simply
seeing contraband. Rather, for an object to be in plain view, it must only be 'obvious to the senses."'
Id. at 297.
265. Officer Rose, for example, testified that he had recovered crack cocaine approximately 75
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conclusion that an officer may readily identify illicit contraband through
touch in the same way people generally identify common objects
through touch seems intuitive. Courts have long recognized an officer's
ability to identify contraband through touch. In the Prohibition-Era
case State v. Chester,266 the Rhode Island Supreme Court upheld the
warrantless seizure of illicit liquor that the investigating officer discov-
ered by feeling the suspect's'breast pocket. 267 The court held that the
officer had ground to arrest the suspect for committing a crime in his
presence, and upheld the search as incident to arrest. 268 The Supreme
Court's conclusion in Dickerson that an officer may accurately recognize
contraband through touch becomes more compelling in light of its
earlier recognition of an officer's ability to identify weapons through
touch. 269 The Minnesota Supreme Court and other state courts refusing
to recognize the plain-touch doctrine have taken a contrary view, hold-
ing that touch is inherently less immediate and less reliable than sight. 270
These conflicting results raise the question of whether police officers
may identify objects more quickly and reliably through sight than
through touch.
When analyzing this issue, a basic principle to keep in mind is that
human beings do not rely exclusively upon any one sense, but upon all
senses. 271 We are 'processors of information,' combining our sensory
perceptions with memory to "make decisions and take actions on the
information we have received." 272 Newborn babies, for example, have
poorly developed vision. 273 For this reason, babies use their other fully-
developed senses in conjunction with their developing sight to explore
to 100 times during the two years he had executed crack and cocaine warrants. Transcript at 5,
Dickerson (No. 89067687). It follows that an officer with more experience in the area would have
additional opportunities to make such seizures.
266. 129 A. 596 (R.I. 1925).
267. State v. Chester, 129 A. 596, 597 (R.I. 1925). The police officers had a warrant to search
for illicit liquor. Id. The warrant named only the saloon as the place to be searched. Id. During the
search, however, one officer noticed what he thought was a bottle concealed within the suspect's
breast pocket. Id. The officer confirmed this fact by placing his hand upon the protruding spot. Id.
Under present law, courts may well have considered this action an unconstitutional second search.
See supra notes 59-69 and accompanying text (discussing Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 320 (1987)).
See also infra notes 421-29 (discussing Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979)).
268. Chester, 129 A. at 599.
269. Dickerson III, 113 S. Ct. at 2137.
270. Dickerson I1, 481 N.W.2d at 845 (Minn. 1992); People v. Diaz, 612 N.E.2d 298, 302 (N.Y.
1993); Commonwealth v. Marconi, 597 A.2d 616, 623 n.17 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991); State v. Broadnax,
654 P.2d 96, 102 (Wash. 1982).
271. As one researcher commented, "'The senses are never separate."' Roberta Israeloff,
"Hello, World!", 65 PARES 110, 116 (Nov. 1990) (quoting Beatrice Beebe, Ph.D.).
272. Norman, MEMORY AND ATrEtmIoN, AN INTRoDucnoN To HuMAN INROmATSON PROCESSING at 3
(2d ed. 1976).
273. Israeloff, supra note 271, at 111-12. Newborn babies are extremely near-sighted, seeing
objects best at a distance of eight to twelve inches. Id. They also have a narrow field of vision, and
must move their heads to compensate for their inability to move their eyes in a wide arc. Id.
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the world during their first months of life.274 This interaction between
the senses continues throughout one's life. As Judge John Kelly of the
Pennsylvania Superior Court wryly commented, "I cannot see how, in
determining probable cause, the eyes can logically or reasonably say to
the hands, 'I have no need of thee."' 275
"Touch is the parent of our eyes, ears, nose, and mouth," wrote
another authority. 276 Touch is the first sense to become functional in all
species,277 and it is the first to develop in the human embryo.278 We may
perceive many characteristics of objects equally well through either
touch or vision,279 although one sense may be superior to another in
perceiving specific qualities. 280 For example, touch is superior to sight
in determining texture, hardness, and other surface variations,281 while
sight is more suited for discerning shape and color.282
Is it possible for a police officer to immediately recognize an object
as contraband within the limited context of a weapons frisk? Studies
undertaken on the human ability to identify objects through touch (also
known as "haptics") 283 offer no answer to this question. Indeed, these
274. Israeloff, supra note 271, at 116; MORTON A. HELLER & WILLIAM SCHIFF, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
TOUCH 7 (Laurence Erlbaum Assoc., 1991).
275. Commonwealth v. Marconi, 597 A.2d 616, 630 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (Kelly, J., concurring).
276. ASHLEY MONTAGU, ToucHINo 1 (Harper & Row 1978).
277. Id.
278. Id. at 2. Montagu added that "[a]s a sensory system, the skin is much the most important
organ system of the body" Id. at 8. As an example, Montagu cited "cutaneous alagia" (loss of the
sense of touch), which could prove life-threatening due to the victim's inability to perceive pain. He
compared this disorder with a human being's ability to become functional without sight or hearing, as
happened with Helen Keller. Id.
279. HELLER & SCHIFF, supra note 274, at 3-4.
280. Id.
281. See Roberta L. Klatzky, et al., There's More to Touch Than Meets the Eye: The Salience of
Object Attributes for Haptics with and Without Vision, 116 J. EXPER. PSYCHOL.: GEN. 356, 368 (1987)
[hereinafter Klatzky '87 study] (concluding that texture and hardness are salient to experimental
subjects exploring objects through touch when visual input is excluded); Roberta Klatzky, et al., Haptic
Integration of Object Properties: Texture, Hardness, and Planar Contour, 15 J. EXPER. PSYCHOL.: HuM.
PERCEPTION & PERF. 45, 48 (1989) [hereinafter Klatzky '89 study] (experimental subjects who were
asked to classify stimuli according to shape, size, and hardness classified objects most quickly
according to texture and hardness); HELLER & SCHIFF, supra note 274, at 4.
282. See Klatzky '87 Study, supra note 281, at 358, 367 (finding that the shape of stimuli became
more easily encoded and more salient to experimental subjects when they combined vision and haptics
than when they explored the stimuli exclusively through haptics). For an explanation of "haptics," see
infra note 283.
283. "Haptics is defined as a perceptual system that incorporates inputs from cutaneous
receptors and also from kinesthetic receptors embedded in muscles, joints and tendons." Klatzky '87
Study, supra note 282, at 356. See also Klatzky A@'89 Study, supra note 281, at 45 (explaining that
"[h]aptics builds on a basic tactual system that incorporates information from cutaneous sensors in the
skin and kinesthetic sensors in the muscles, tendons, and joints"); See 2 INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF
MEDICINE AND BIOLOGY at 1271 (Sidney I. Landau et al. eds 1986) (defining haptics as "[tihe science
of touch, pertaining not only to passively perceived cutaneous sensations of touch and pressure, but
including also the active component of exploration via these senses").
Cutaneous perceptions are mere surface sensations. Cutaneous nerves "provide sensory
pathways for stimuli to the skin." TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY at 441 (16th ed. 1989).
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studies are inconclusive at best. As one authority aptly described the
situation, "there is no 'single theory' of touch. The field has not pro-
gressed to the point where we have theoretical conformity, because too
many issues remain unresolved." 284
In their 1985 study, Roberta Klatzky, Susan Lederman, and Victoria
Metzger concluded that an individual may quickly and accurately
identify common objects exclusively through haptics. 2 8 5  The
experimental participants identified 100 common objects, such as a
comb, balloon, ash tray, muffin pan, or potato. 286 The study scored
"superordinate" (overly broad) responses as errors.287 For example, the
researchers marked a broad answer such as "vegetable" for onion as an
incorrect response. The study also considered "corrected-
superordinate" responses as errors. 288 In other words, if a participant
initially identified an object as "clothing," but then substituted the
correct specific category such as "sweater," this response was neverthe-
less considered incorrect. 289 "Categorically-related" responses were
also considered incorrect (e.g., "sock" instead of "sweater"). 290 The
final group of incorrect responses, obviously, involved categorically-
unrelated responses, such as "rock" for "potato." 29 1 The participants
identified the objects with an accuracy rate of 96%, which increased to
99% under a more lenient scoring system that permitted the super-
ordinate, corrected-superordinate, and categorically-related responses
previously scored as incorrect to be scored as correct. 292 Under the strict
scoring system, 94% of the subjects who correctly named an object did
so within five seconds of receiving it.293 In spite of these results, the
researchers carefully qualified their experimental findings, warning "we
See also DoRLAND's ILLUS'RATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY at 414 (27th ed. 1988) (defining cutaneous as
"pertaining to the skin; dermal, dermic"); 2 INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE AND BIOLOGY,
supra, at 1903 (explaining that a cutaneous nerve is a "nerve supplying an area of skin and its
underlying fascia").
Kinesthetic sensations (or "kinesthesia") provide information about the "movement of the body
or its parts." INTERNATIONAL DICnToNARY OFMEDICINE AND BIOLOGY, supra, at 1508. See also TABER'S
CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY, supra, at 976 (defining kinesthesia as the "[a]bility to perceive
extent, direction, or weight of movement"); DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY, supra, at
880 (defining kinesthesia as "the sense by which movement, weight, position, etc., are perceived").
284. HELLER & ScHiFF, supra note 274, at ix.
285. Roberta L. Klatzky, et al., Identifying Objects by Touch: An "Expert System", 37
PERCEPTION & PSYCHOPHYSICS 299,301 (1985) [hereinafter Klatzky '85 Study].
286. Id. at 302.
287. Id. at 300.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Klatzky '85 Study, supra note 285, at 300.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 301.
293. Id.
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do not mean to claim that the perception of form through touch is
generally accurate and efficient." 294
A subsequent study by Klatzky and Susan Lederman and Catherine
Reed conducted in 1987 analyzed the methods that people use to
explore objects through haptics. 295  The experiments employed
"wafers" consisting of three sizes, shapes, and hardness values, enclosed
within fabric of three different textures. 296 This study (and a subsequent
study by the same authors) 297 reported that people use "lateral motion"
(a rubbing action) to determine an object's surface texture, "pressure"
(squeezing) to determine hardness, "static contact" to determine surface
temperature, and "unsupported holding" (holding an object in one
hand without the support of the other) to determine weight.298 The
experimental participants enclosed objects within their hands to
determine gross contour information (the objects' general shape and
size). 299 The subjects also attempted to determine an object's precise
contour information through a process labelled "contour following" in
which they ran their fingers and hands over the surface of an object. 300
The experiment concluded that "haptic encoding has an inherent
bias toward the way objects feel, and not toward how they may look."301
Thus, when experimental participants explored objects strictly through
haptics, texture and hardness were highly salient, while the salience of
shape and size was low. 302 The salience of shape and size increased,
however, with the introduction of vision or visual imagery. 303 The
participants reduced their use of slow processes such as contour follow-
ing when they viewed the objects, but the salience of texture and hard-
ness also declined with visual input.304
294. Id.
295. Klatzky '87 Study, supra note 281, at 359.
296. Id. The fact that the objects were enclosed within fabric is important since an officer
performing a weapons frisk must also feel objects through an outer fabric.
297. Klatzky '89 Study, supra note 281.
298. Klatzky '87 Study, supra note 281, at 358; Klatzky '89 Study, supra note 281, at 45.
299. Klatzky '87 Study, supra note 281, at 351; Klatzky '89 Study, supra note 281, at 45.
300. Klatzky '87 Study, supra note 281, at 358; Klatzky '89 Study, supra note 281, at 45.
301. Klatzky '87 Study, supra. note 281, at 367.
302. Id. at 367-68.
303. Id. at 367. Overall, the researchers performed four experiments in which the subjects
sorted objects into various bins according to size, shape, hardness, etc.. All subjects in these four
experiments explored the stimuli haptically with or without visual information. Those who received
visual information received two kinds of visual information. They either viewed the objects while
haptically exploring them, or they were blindfolded and told to group objects together if the objects'
visual images were similar (i.e., the subjects imagined what the objects would look like if they could
see the objects, and grouped them together according to whether objects mentally "looked" similar).
See id. at 359, 365 (explaining the experimental method).
304. Klatzky '87 Study, supra note 281, at 368. For an explanation of the visual input that the
experimental subjects received during the experiments, see supra note 303.
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Another study performed by Professors Bill Jones and Sandra
O'Neil in 1985 found that people make visual and haptic judgments of
surface roughness with comparable accuracy, although their experimen-
tal subjects made visual judgments more quickly and efficiently. 305
Jones and O'Neil underscored the commonsensical nature of this result
by saying: "In the nature of things, it will take longer to run one's
fingers over an object than it will to scan the object visually."306 Profes-
sor Klatzky's 1985 study, however, suggested that practice may play a
role in the differences between haptic and visual identification. 307
Obviously, if someone has repeatedly viewed an object, and then feels it
for the first time without seeing it, haptically identifying the object will
be more difficult and less efficient than visually identifying it. It logical-
ly follows that haptic performance will improve with practice. 308
Both the empirical data and common experience reinforce the
principle that human beings combine all senses when perceiving the
world. Vision is not, as the Minnesota Supreme Court suggested, more
"reliable" than other senses. Vision, moreover, is relatively easy to
fool.309 A partially submerged oar appears crooked, but an individual
may verify that the oar is, in fact, straight by running a hand along the
length of the oar, above and below the water. 310 People may determine
whether a flower is artificial through touch more easily than they can
through vision alone.311 Comparing the reliability of vision with the
sense of smell, the Supreme Court of Oregon offered this Prohibition-
Era example: "Lipton's tea might look ever so much like Scotch
Whiskey and fool many people dependent solely upon sight, but few
would be misled through the sense of smell." 3 12
305. Bill Jones & Sandra O'Neil, Combining Vision and Touch in Texture Perception, 37
PERCEPTnoN & PsvcuoPivsics 66,71 (1985).
306. Id. at 71.
307. Klatzky '85 Study, supra note 281, at 300. It is important to remember that the 1985 Klatzky
Study examined object identification, while the Jones & O'Neil study examined judgment of surface
textures.
308. See Klatzky '85 Study, supra note 281, at 300 (stating that "practice ... has been found to
improve haptic discrimination performance").
309. HELLER & ScHiFF, supra note 274, at 11.
310. Id. at 9 (citing "John Locke's classic example").
311. Id. at 11.
312. State v. McDaniel, 237 P. 373, 375 (Or. 1925). Studies in the field of cognitive psychology
have also demonstrated that visual identification and recall can prove deceptive, particularly with
familiar objects. ARNOLD LEwis GLAss & KErrH JAMEs HOLYOAK, COGNmON at 194-97 (2d ed. 1986).
When people identify a familiar object, they frequently match critical features with the object's
category in memory, rather than viewing the object in detail. Id. at 194-96. This process can render
someone's memory of the object incomplete when attempting to recall it. In one experiment,
researchers discovered that people had considerable difficulty selecting the correct version of the
head side of a penny when the researchers placed it among 14 distractors that either omitted or
modified certain features. Id. at 194-95. The subjects experienced greater difficulty when they
attempted to draw the penny from memory. Id. at 195. Many people will discover a similar result if
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Because neither experimental data nor common experience suggests
a hierarchy of senses, the courts should not take rigid positions indicat-
ing that one sense is somehow more reliable than another in identifying
illicit contraband. Initially, the Minnesota Supreme Court's conclusion
that plain touch is "less immediate" 313 than sight seems correct in light
of the data showing that people must "pinch, squeeze, and rub" 3 14 an
object in order to determine its properties, but it is equally possible that
repeated encounters with the same object may make its nature "immedi-
ately apparent" to a police officer who touches it during a frisk.315 The
data also do not support Justice Tomijanovich's second conclusion that
touch is "less reliable" 316 than sight. As mentioned above, people can
accurately identify objects through touch.
Positive identification, however, is unnecessary under the new plain-
touch doctrine. A police officer need only develop probable cause to
believe that an object is contraband in order to activate the plain-touch
doctrine. As Judge Weinstein of the Eastern District of New York
remarked, "[a]ny of the five senses, alone or in combination, may
provide reliable evidence" for an officer to develop probable cause.317
they attempt to draw the face of a telephone dial, placing all numbers and letters in their correct
places. Id. at 194. The striking point about these examples is that people were unable to accurately
reproduce from memory objects that they see and use every day.
313. Dickerson 11, 481 N.W.2d 840 at 845.
314. Id.
315. Familiarity with an object and repeated exposure to it increase the speed with which
someone recognizes an object. See GLASS & HOLYOAK, supra note 312, at 323 (stating that "as an input
is repeated, the analysis and comparison procedure for it becomes increasingly automatized, so the
time required to find a match in memory is reduced"). See also Klatzky '85 Study, supra note 281, at
300 ("practice ... has been found to improve haptic discrimination performance").
316. Dickerson 1I, 481 N.W.2d at 845. In a recent telephone interview, Arnold Lewis Glass,
Professor of Psychology at Rutgers University in New Brunswick, NJ, said that the Minnesota Supreme
Court chose an awkward phrase when it characterized touch as "less immediate and less reliable than
the sense of sight." "What they meant to say," Professor Glass said, "is that touch is more limited for
purposes of identifying contraband. There is a big distinction between identifying weapons and
identifying contraband through touch." As an example, Professor Glass compared the rigid outline of
a gun with the numerous shapes and textures associated with drug packaging. Professor Glass doubted
that a limited weapons frisk could provide the same amount of information as a plain view, especially
since the Supreme Court in Dickerson forbade officers to manipulate nonthreatening objects detected
during a frisk. "Of course," he continued, "there may be a shock of recognition that something is
contraband during the course of a weapons search" for an officer who has had hundreds of
opportunities to feel certain types of drug packaging. Professor Glass also expressed concern that
permitting officers to seize nonthreatening objects during a Terry frisk will create an intrusion upon
personal privacy beyond that which the Supreme Court had originally intended. For example, he
explained, Dickerson now seems to permit police officers to reach into a suspect's pocket and seize
tissues, handkerchiefs, or other personal items that people carry in their pockets. Telephone Interview
with Arnold Lewis Glass, Ph.D., Professor of Psychology, Rutgers University-New Brunswick (Sept.
10, 1993).
317. United States v. Ceballos, 719 F. Supp. 119, 128 (E.D.N.Y. 1989). See also Guidi v.
Superior Court, 513 P.2d 908, 921-22 (Cal. 1973) (Mosk, J., concurring) (finding that "all the senses[]
may be employed, not merely in confirmation of what is already visible, but in equal weight with the
sense of sight in the determination of probable cause").
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Probable cause, moreover, "does not deal with hard certainties, but with
probabilities." 3 18 It is
a flexible, common-sense standard. It merely requires that the
facts available to the officer would "warrant a man of reason-
able caution in the belief' . that certain items may be contra-
band or stolen property or useful as evidence of a crime; it
does not demand any showing that such a belief be correct or
more likely true than false. A "practical, nontechnical" proba-
bility that incriminating evidence is involved is all that is
required. 319
Thus, when Justice White wrote that the identity of an object felt
during a Terry frisk must be "immediately apparent," 320 he referred to a
lower standard than the positive identification required for "correct"
scores in the 1985 Klatzky Study.321 Indeed, probable cause suggests a
standard akin to the lenient grading system that would have supported a
99% accuracy rate for haptic identification in the experiments. Problem-
atic, however, is the fact that the haptic experiments permitted subjects to
manipulate objects in order to identify them. Under Dickerson, such
manipulation would constitute an impermissible separate search.
Is the sense of touch sufficiently accurate to provide a police officer
with probable cause? Given the conflicting conclusions that one may
draw from the available data and common experience, this question
remains open for further exploration. It is inappropriate to apply the
available scientific data to draw definitive conclusions about the reliabili-
ty of touch in the context of search-and-seizure law because the psychol-
ogists who performed the haptic studies outlined above did not conduct
318. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411,418 (1981).
319. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983) (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132,
162 (1925); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949)).
320. Dickerson 111, 113 S. Ct. at 2137.
321. For a breakdown of the scoring system in the 1985 Klatzky haptic identification
experiments, see supra notes 287-93 and accompanying text. Cf. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983)
(clarifying the "immediately apparent" requirement which Justice Stewart had originally pronounced
in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,466 (1971)):
the phrase "immediately apparent" was very likely an unhappy choice of words, since it
can be taken to imply that an unduly high degree of certainty as to the incriminatory
character of evidence is necessary for an application of the "plain view" doctrine.
Plainly, the Court did not view the "immediately apparent" language of Coolidge as
establishing any requirement that a police officer "know" that certain items are
contraband or evidence of a crime. Indeed, . . . the rule [is] .. . that "the seizure of
property in plain view involves no invasion of privacy and is presumptively reasonable,
assuming that there is probable cause to associate the property with criminal activity.
Id. at 741-42 (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 587 (1980)). For a critique of Justice
Rehnquist's opinion in Texas v. Brown, see supra note 243.
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their experiments for this purpose. The 1985 Klatzky study, for exam-
ple, noted that the researchers performed their work with the goal of
developing tangible graphics for the visually handicapped.322 Neverthe-
less, two briefs submitted in Dickerson cited the above studies on haptics
to support arguments on both sides of the issue.323
Before the courts, law enforcement officials, or other members of
the legal community draw conclusions about tactile identification,
experts on sensory perception must perform experiments that closely
approximate the tactile observations made during weapons frisks. Haptic
experiments that duplicate Terry frisks could answer the questions of
whether tactile information is sufficiently reliable to support probable
cause, and whether information discovered during a frisk is less "imme-
diate" than that which officers see in plain-view circumstances. Such
studies will no doubt prove most interesting for the legal and scientific
communities alike. For the present, a trial court's determination about
whether the incriminating nature of a nonthreatening object is "immedi-
ately apparent" to a police officer during a pat-down frisk will depend
entirely upon weighing the credibility of the officer's testimony. More
important, however, is whether the officer was justified in stopping and
frisking the suspect in the first place. The trial court must, therefore,
meticulously scrutinize the stop and the frisk before it even reaches the
plain-touch issue.
IV. THE FORCIBLE STOP AND FRISK OF DICKERSON
On December 19, 1989, Timothy Dickerson was charged with fifth-
degree possession of a controlled substance under Minnesota law. 324
After the trial court denied his suppression motion, the defendant and
the prosecution submitted a fact stipulation with a waiver of a jury trial,
which the trial court accepted.325 The trial court found that the prosecu-
tion had met its burden of proving that Dickerson committed the offense
charged, but deferred any finding of guilt under a Minnesota sentencing
option for minor drug offenses. 326 Because this was Dickerson's first
offense, and because he had an otherwise clean record, the trial court
judge placed Dickerson on probation for two years, requiring that he
322. Klatzky '85 Study, supra note 281, at 301.
323. See Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 15-17, Minnesota v. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993)
(No. 91-2019); Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union and the Minnesota Civil Liberties Union
as Amicus Curiae at 15, Minnesota v. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993) (No. 91-2019).
324. MinN. STAT. §§ 152.025 subd. 2 (1) & (3)(a) (1989).
325. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 5, Minnesota v. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993) (No.
2019); Respondent's Brief in Opposition to Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 3, Minnesota v.
Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993) (No. 91-2019).
326. MiN. STAT § 152.18 subd. 1 (1989).
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fulfill a number of conditions, including drug testing. 327  After
Dickerson satisfied these conditions, the state District Court entered an
order on April 28, 1992, dismissing the complaint against Dickerson,
and discharging him from supervision. 328  Dickerson's successful
completion of the program also entitled him to apply for an order
expunging his record.329
As noted earlier, the Minnesota appellate courts accepted the
premise that Officers Rose and Johnson properly conducted their investi-
gative stop of Dickerson upon a reasonable, articulable suspicion that he
was engaged in criminal activity. The Minnesota appellate courts further
accepted, as did the Supreme Court, that the officers reasonably feared
Dickerson was armed and presently dangerous when Officer Rose
frisked him for weapons (and contraband, as Officer Rose admitted). A
close examination of the record in comparison with other stop-and-frisk
precedents, however, leads to the inescapable conclusion that the officers
were unjustified in forcibly stopping and frisking Dickerson.
A. THE STOP
In Brown v. Texas,330 police stopped Zachery Brown in an alley
located in an area of El Paso, Texas known for its high incidence of drug
trafficking 331 after observing suspicious behavior. 332 In sharp contrast to
Timothy Dickerson's response during his stop, Brown "refused to
identify himself and angrily asserted that the officers had no right to
stop him." 33 3 The officers then frisked him, and, finding nothing
remarkable, arrested him for violating a Texas statute criminalizing a
person's refusal to give his name and address to a police officer who has
lawfully stopped him and requested the information. 334 The Court
found both the stop and the statute, as applied in this situation, unconsti-
327. Hennepin County District Court Probation Order, Filed June 4, 1990, reprinted in Joint
Appendix, Minnesota v. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993) (No. 91-2019); Transcript at 68-69,
Dickerson (No. 89067687).
328. Hennepin County District Court Order Discharging Defendant from Supervision and
Dismissing Complaint, Filed May 6, 1992, reprinted in Joint Appendix at 37-38, Minnesota v.
Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993) (No. 91-2019).
329. MINN. STAT. § 152.18 subd. 2 (1989). Dickerson did not have to follow this procedure,
however, since the state exhausted all appeals from the reversal of his criminal conviction. Instead,
Section 299C. I1 of the Minnesota Statutes entitled him to apply for expungement of his criminal record
after the state's final appeal. Judge Lynn granted the expungement motion on October 28, 1993.
330. 443 U.S. 47 (1979).
331. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47,49 (1979).
332. Id. at 48-49. The police officers had observed Brown and another man walking in opposite
directions. Id. Both officers believed that the two had been together or were about to meet until the
police car appeared. Id. at 48.
333. Id. at 49.
334. Id.
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tutional.335 In arriving at this conclusion, the Court reasoned "[tihere is
no indication in the record that it was unusual for people to be in the
alley. The fact that appellant was in a neighborhood frequented by drug
users, standing alone, is not a basis for concluding that appellant himself
was engaged in criminal conduct." 336
Likewise, in Reid v. Georgia,337 DEA agents stopped an individual
because he conformed with many characteristics of a "Drug Courier
Profile," 338 including (1) he had arrived from Fort Lauderdale, a point
of origin for cocaine trafficking, (2) he "arrived in the early morning,
when law enforcement activity is diminished," (3) he and his companion
appeared to be "trying to conceal the fact that they were traveling
together," and (4) they had no luggage other than their identical
shoulder bags. 339 The Court held these factors insufficient to support a
forcible stop under the Fourth Amendment and Terry.
Of the evidence relied on, only the fact that the petitioner
preceded another person and occasionally looked backward at
him as they proceeded through the concourse relates to their
particular conduct. The other circumstances describe a very
large category of presumably innocent travelers, who would be
subject to virtually random seizures were the Court to conclude
that as little foundation as there was in this case could justify a
seizure .... Although there could, of course, be circumstances
in which wholly lawful conduct might justify the suspicion that.
criminal activity was afoot, this is not such a case.340
In light of Brown and Reid, serious questions arise about the consti-
tutionality of the forcible stop of Dickerson. First, "[t]here is no indica-
tion in the record that it was unusual for people to be in the alley." 341
Second, "[tihe fact that [Dickerson] ...was in a neighborhood fre-
quented by drug users, standing alone, is not a basis for concluding that
[Dickerson] ...himself was engaged in criminal conduct." 342 Third,
Dickerson's abrupt change in direction upon leaving the apartment
building could be attributed to any one of a number of lawful rea-
sons. 343 Assuming that Dickerson's behavior manifested his desire to
335. Id. at 52, 53.
336. Brown, 443 U.S. at 52.
337. 448 U.S. 438 (1980).
338. For an explanation of the "drug courier profile," see supra note 155 and accompanying text.
339. Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438,441 (1980).
340. Id. (citation omitted).
341. See Brown, 443 U.S. at 52.
342. See id.
343. Transcript at 29, Dickerson (No. 89067687). During the suppression motion, he claimed
that the alley provided the fastest route to a friend's house. Id. See also State v. Hobart, 617 P.2d 429,
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avoid the police, whether this fact, even when combined with his presence
in a neighborhood known for drug activity, supports either a forcible
stop or a frisk is questionable. Law-abiding citizens who reside in
neighborhoods with high crime rates may wish to avoid visible contact
with police due to a fear that their less savory neighbors may suspect
them of being informers, and the possible reprisals that would flow
therefrom. 344 Avoiding the police simply because one dislikes them,
moreover, is not a crime. 345 Given the nature of the neighborhood,
Dickerson's behavior may well "describe a very large category of
presumably innocent [pedestrians in the neighborhood], who would be
subject to virtually random seizures were the Court to conclude that as
little foundation as there was in this case could justify a seizure. '"346
In State v. Tucker,347 both the New Jersey Appellate Division and
the New Jersey Supreme Court recently held that an individual's effort to
avoid the police does not justify a forcible stop. While on patrol in
Trenton, New Jersey, a police officer observed Stanley Tucker seated on
a curb.348 When Tucker saw the approaching police vehicle, he "quick-
ly got up, turned, and started running through [a nearby yard]."349 The
officer then alerted other officers in the neighborhood, who joined him
in pursuing Tucker.350 At one point, Tucker tossed a clear plastic bag
into the opening of a nearby porch. 35 1 The officer eventually appre-
433 (Wash. 1980) (remarking that a driver's decision to suddenly turn his automobile down a side
street "can be engendered by any number of circumstances, including the realization by the driver
that he reached or passed the street for which he was looking").
344. One motive for drug-related murders is the suspicion by drug traffickers that the victim may
have been an informer. See Paul J. Goldstein et al., Drug-Related Homicide in New York: 1984 and
1988,38 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 459,462 (1992) ("Systemic homicides include ... killing of informers
in drug cases.").
345. Distrust of the police among black males sometimes manifests itself in flight when police
appear. Tracey Maclin, "Black and Blue Encounters" - Some Preliminary Thoughts About Fourth
Amendment Seizures: Should Race Matter?, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 243, 256-57 (1991). A recent New
Jersey Supreme Court task force report also indicated that "blacks are less likely to report crimes to
police because mimy feel victimized by police and believe that police do not adequately protect their
neighborhoods." Minorities and the Courts: Equal Use, Unequal Justice?, THE REcoRD, Jan. 25, 1994,
at A-12. This distrust also seems to hold true for members of other ethnic minorities. See Gabriel
Silva, Police 'Should Not Make Assumptions', LA. TIMEs, Sept. 28, 1992, at B4 (detailing an incident
during which teen-age Latinos fled in fear from the presence of a police officer, although the youths
had committed no crime). Blair Underwood, star of television's "LA Law," explained one reason why
people may assume a defensive posture when they are confronted by the police. "A silent fear has
been generated within Black men across the nation," he said. "For now, there is a fear that the enemy
is dressed in blue." National Study Reports White Cops' Beatings of Blacks Reveal 'Dirty Secrets of
Racism', JET, May 3, 1993, at 14, 17. See also Eloise Salholz et al., Blacks and Cops: Up Against a
Wall, NEWSWEEK, May 11, 1992, at 52; Daniel E. Georges-Abeyie, Law Enforcement and Racial and
Ethnic Bias, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 717 (1992).
346. Reid, 448 U.S. at 441.
347. 627 A.2d 174 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993), aff'd, 642 A.2d 401 (NJ. 1994).
348. 627 A.2d at 175.
349. Id.
350. Id.
351. Id.
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hended Tucker and retrieved the plastic bag, which proved to contain
crack cocaine. 352  Reversing Tucker's conviction, Judge Geoffrey
Gaulkin wrote that "the only ostensible basis for [the officer] to have
pursued defendant was that defendant had inexplicably fled when he saw
the police van. But flight from the police does not alone create a reason-
able suspicion of criminal conduct." 353 Judge Gaulkin, therefore, held
that the trial court should have suppressed the evidence of the crack
cocaine. 354 The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning that
guilty knowledge does not necessarily explain "why a young man in a
contemporary urban setting may run at the sight of the police. That
some city residents may not feel entirely comfortable in the presence of
some, if not all, police is regrettable but true. '355
The constitutionality of forcibly stopping Dickerson grows more
doubtful when one compares the officers' conduct with that of the police
in other landmark search-and-seizure cases. In Terry, for example, the
investigating police officer approached the suspects only after his
extended observations confirmed his fear that the three men were
preparing for an armed robbery-a crime of violence. 356 He identified
himself as a police officer and requested their names. 357 He grabbed
one suspect only after the suspects' response proved evasive.358 Similar-
ly, in Adams v. Williams ,359 the investigating police officer confronted
the suspect in his car only after the officer received a tip from a reliable
informant that the suspect was armed and carrying narcotics .360
In contrast, Officers Rose and Johnson observed Timothy Dickerson
for a matter of seconds before deciding to stop him.361 Their observa-
352. Id.
353. State v. Tucker, 627 A.2d at 175. See also In re James R., 559 N.E.2d 1273 (N.Y. 1990)
(finding that the flight of suspect's three companions when approached by police, combined with
officer's previous observation of the four walking in unison, did not necessarily rise to the level of
reasonable suspicion required for a forcible stop). But see State v. Johnson, 444 N.W.2d 824 (Minn.
1989) (finding that a suspect's evasive conduct can justify an investigative stop). See also California v.
Hodari D., 111 S. Ct. 1547 (1991). In Hodari, two police officers on routine patrol observed a group
of youths huddled around a car in a high-crime area of Oakland, California. Id. at 1549. One officer
chased a suspect and seized him by tackling him after the group fled in an apparent state of panic
upon seeing the police. Immediately prior to the seizure, the suspect tossed away a small object which
later proved to be crack cocaine. Id. The issue of whether the officer had sufficient reasonable
suspicion to justify an investigative stop was not before the Court. Id. at 1549 & n.l. The State
conceded, however, that the chasing officer "did not have the 'reasonable suspicion' required to
justify stopping Hodari."
354. Tucker, 627 A.2d at 175.
355. 642 A.2d at 407 (citations omitted).
356. Terry, 392 U.S. at 33 (Harlan, J., concurring) (describing the suspected armed robbery as a
.crime of violence").
357. Id. at 6-7.
358. Id. at 7.
359. 407 US. 143 (1972).
360. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 144-45 (1972).
361. The length of an observation alone, of course, is not dispositive in determining whether a
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tions consisted of (1) Dickerson allegedly making eye contact with
Officer Rose, 362 and (2) Dickerson abruptly turning and walking down
the alley. Indeed, the investigating officers decided to stop Dickerson
immediately after watching him walk into the alley. 3 63 To support the
stop, Officer Rose cited these observations and the fact that Dickerson
had exited a known "crack house," 364 where Rose had "responded to
calls of drug dealers in the hallways," 3 65 and where he had previously
recovered weapons and narcotics.3 66 Officer Rose could not, however,
identify which of the twelve apartment units he had executed warrants in,
or how many warrants he had executed in the building overall. 367 His
best estimate was that he had executed approximately four warrants over
the previous two years. 368 Officer Rose's knowledge of illicit drug trade
conducted in the hallways of 1030 Morgan Avenue, moreover, did not
support a conclusion that every unit in the apartment building was an
armed drug den, or that every person leaving the building was probably
a criminal. If one considers the continual flow of people into and from
the building, in addition to the apartment residents, it becomes clear that
many innocent people enter and leave the building every day, including
friends, relatives, neighbors, and repairmen. If nothing more than an
individual's action in leaving a so-called "crack house" is sufficient to
justify an investigative stop, then numerous people could be stopped on
sight. The identity of the people who placed the "calls of drug dealers
in the hallways" at 1030 Morgan Avenue also remains a mystery.
Residents of 1030 Morgan Avenue may have made these complaints.
Until the search proved otherwise, the unidentified black male whom the
officers observed exiting the building may very well have been a law-
abiding resident who had previously placed calls to the police about
drug dealers in the hallways.
stop or a frisk is justified. Compare Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968) (observation over eight
hours) with Terry, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (observation for 12 minutes).
362. Whether Dickerson in fact made eye contact with Officer Rose is also questionable. Rose
estimated that he and Dickerson made eye contact from a distance of 20 to 40 feet in the darkness of
night. Transcript at 23, Dickerson (No. 89067687).
363. Transcript at 14, 16, 24, Dickerson (No. 89067687). Officer Johnson's written report
indicated that after observing Dickerson walk into the alley, he told Officer Rose that he "wanted to
stop this party." Id. at 24.
364. Rose testified that he knew of "[n]umerous complaints about a crack house." Transcript at
14, Dickerson (No. 89067687). He added: "that place goes 24 hours a day." Id. The Solicitor
General's brief described the building as a "known 'crack house.'" Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae at 2, Minnesota v. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993) (No. 91-2019).
365. Transcript at 7, Dickerson (No. 89067687).
366. Id.
367. Id. at 22. When the cross-examining public defender pressed him for an estimate of the
number of warrants he had executed in the building over the previous two years, suggesting ten or
fifteen as general figures, Officer Rose responded "I wouldn't say ten." Id.
368. See id. ("I know we have done a couple of doubles").
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B. THE FRISK
Judge Friendly once remarked that he had "the gravest hesitancy in
extending Terry to crimes like the possession of narcotics .... There is
too much danger that, instead of the stop being the object and the
protective frisk an incident thereto, the reverse will be true." 369 The
Court, he believed, intended the exception "for the serious cases of
imminent danger or of harm recently perpetrated to persons or property,
not the conventional ones of possessory offenses." 370 Justice Harlan
similarly concluded that there was no need for immediate action in
Sibron v. New York 371 because the suspect did nothing to suggest that he
was planning a violent crime. "If the nature of the suspected offense
creates no reasonable apprehension for the officer's safety," Justice
Harlan wrote, "I would not permit him to frisk."372 As noted earlier, the
Court's simultaneous decisions upholding the frisk and seizure of
weapons in'Terry, and striking down the seizure of narcotics in Sibron,
support the conclusion that police may conduct protective pat-down
frisks on less than probable cause only in situations where they fear
imminent violence, and not in situations where they suspect a passive
crime such as possession of narcotics. In recognizing a plain-touch
doctrine, therefore, the Court seems to have opened the door to the very
sort of abuse that Judge Friendly warned of-the danger that the police
may use a Terry search ostensibly for weapons to justify a search in fact
for contraband.373
In Terry, however, Justice Harlan also suggested that "the right to
frisk must be immediate and automatic if the reason for the stop is, as
here, an articulable suspicion of a crime of violence." 374 Justice Harlan
further observed "it is not clear that suspected possession of narcotics
falls into this category." 375
369. Williams v. Adams, 436 F.2d 30, 38-39 (2d Cir. 1971) (Friendly, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added), vacated, 441 F.2d 294 (2d Cir. 1971), revd, 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
370. 436 F.2d at 39 (emphasis added).
371. 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
372. Sibron, 392 U.S.' at 74 (Harlan, J., concurring).
373. At least three state supreme courts have warned of the pretext searches that would result
from recognizing a plain-touch exception. See People v. Diaz, 612 N.E.2d 298, 302 (N.Y. 1993);
State v. Collins, 679 P.2d 80, 84 (Ariz. 1984); State v. Broadnax, 654 P.2d 96, 102 (Wash. 1982); State
v. Hobart, 617 P.2d 429,434 (Wash. 1980) (en banc).
374. Terry, 392,U.S. at 33 (Harlan, J., concurring). See also Sibron, 392 U.S. at 74 (Harlan, J.,
concurring) (stating that the right to frisk is automatic where the police officer "lawfully stops a
person suspected of a crime whose nature creates a substantial likelihood that he is armed"). One
author has taken the extreme position that the Court should permit police officers to automatically frisk
all suspects whom they have legitimately stopped. Mitchell Lampson, On the Silver Anniversary of
Terry v. Ohio: The Reasonableness of an Automatic Frisk, 28 CRIM. L. BuLL. 336,337 (JuIJAug. 1992)
(emphasis added).
375. Sibron, 392 U.S. at 74 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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If it is uncertain whether drug possessors fall into the category of
potentially violent criminals whom the police may frisk immediately,
drug dealers certainly do. The violence inherent in the illicit drug
trafficking system accounted for 74% of drug-related homicides com-
mitted in New York City in 1988.376 In United States v. Ceballos,377
Judge Weinstein of the Eastern District of New York concluded that the
nature of narcotics trafficking justifies an officer's belief that a suspected
drug dealer may be armed and dangerous. 378 The Wisconsin Supreme
Court has also candidly remarked "that drug dealers and weapons go
hand in hand, thus warranting a Terry frisk for weapons." 379 The drug-
related violence regularly reported in the nation's news media further
confirms the image of drug dealers as dangerous criminals.380 As Chief
376. Goldstein et al., supra note 334, at 466. In classifying a homicide as "drug-related," police
included homicides in which the perpetrator or the victim had ingested alcohol. Id. at 463, 466-67
(Tables 1 & 2). For a discussion of the impact of alcohol upon drug-related violence, see infra notes
384-86 and accompanying text. In 1988 in New York City, 52.7% of all homicides committed were
classified generally as "drug-related." Id. at 465. In New York State (outside New York City) 41.7%
of homicides reported in 1984 were classified as "drug-related." Id. The study categorized drug-
related homicides as "Psychopharmacological," "Economic Compulsive," "Systemic," and
"Multidimensional." Psychopharmacological homicides were homicides in which either the victim or
the perpetrator had ingested a mood-altering substance, including alcohol. Economic Compulsive
violence was thought to occur when a drug user felt compelled to engage in a crime to support a drug
habit. Systemic homicides are those homicides related to the generally aggressive behavior of
individuals within the drug-trafficking system. Multidimensional homicides, as the name suggests,
were homicides that combined elements of two or more of the first three categories. Id. at 461-62.
As mentioned in the text, systemic violence accounted for 74% of all "drug-related" homicides.
Of the systemic homicides, 61% were related to crack cocaine trafficking, while 27% were related to
trafficking in powdered cocaine. Id. at 469. Thus, cocaine trafficking accounted for 93% of the
systemic homicides committed in New York City in 1988. Id. Multidimensional homicides accounted
for 8% of drug-related homicides committed in New York City in 1988. Id. at 466. For a discussion of
psychopharmacological homicides and economic-compulsive homicides, see infra notes 382-86 and
accompanying text.
377. 719 F. Supp. 119 (E.D.N.Y. 1989).
378. United States v. Ceballos, 719 F. Supp. 119, 128 (E.D.N.Y. 1989). It is important to note that
the Ceballos court repeatedly referred to drug trafficking suspects in approving the use of an automatic
frisk. The court made no similar statement regarding individuals whom the police suspect of
possession. See id. at 126.
379. State v. Richardson, 456 N.W.2d 830, 836 (Wis. 1990), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 3020 (1993).
See also United States v. Post, 607 F.2d 847, 852 (9th Cir. 1979) (DEA agent alone in a room with a
suspected narcotics dealer was justified in frisking the suspect for weapons); State v. Guy, 492
N.W.2d 311, 315 (Wis. 1992) (noting the violence associated with drug trafficking), cert. denied, 113
S. Ct. 3020 (1993).
380. See, e.g., Felicia R. Lee, A Drug Dealer's Rapid Rise and Ugly Fall, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10,
1994, at 1; 4 Dead, 3 Wounded in Bronx Rampage, TmE RECORD, Sept. 17, 1993, at A-6; Arnold H.
Lubasch, 8 Are Charged in Drug Slayings, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1993, at B3; Richard D. Lyons, Child,
11, Wounded as Two Groups Trade Fire in Bronx, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 1993, at B3; Dennis Hevesi, 9
Men Posing as Police are Indicted in 3 Murders, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1992, at B3; James Bennet,
Condition Worsens for Baby Who Escaped Triple Slaying, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 1992, at 27; David
Gonzalez, Ring That Kidnaps Drug Dealers Is Linked by Police to Murders, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25,
1991, at 35; Seth Faison, Jr., Man's Corpse Is Discovered in Cardboard Box Outside a Bank on Park
Avenue, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 1991, at 27; George James, Twice Killed, Once Dead: Drug Suspect
Dies for Real, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 1991, at A20; Clara Germani, 'My Future's Good - If I Live',
CHRISrAN SCI. MON., Jan. 25, 1991, at 12; Another Bloody Year, TIME, Jan. 8, 1990, at 51.
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Justice Rehnquist once commented, "[i]n the narcotics business, 'fire-
arms are as much "tools of the trade" as are most commonly recog-
nized articles of narcotics paraphernalia.' 381 For these reasons, police
could easily justify an immediate frisk where they suspect the individual
whom they have stopped of being a drug dealer.
No authority similarly supports an immediate frisk where the police
have less than probable cause to suspect possession only. One study has
questioned the "common assumption ... that the public safety is endan-
gered by persons who are 'crazed killers' due to the use of illicit sub-
stances," 382 finding that drug users who finance their habits through
criminal activity normally avoid violent crimes when seeking money to
purchase drugs. 383 The study further reported that alcohol, a legally
obtainable substance, played a role in the vast majority (77%) of "psy-
chopharmacological" homicides in which the crime occurred after
either the victim or the perpetrator ingested an intoxicating substance.384
Psychopharmacological homicides accounted for 14% of drug-related
homicides committed in New York City overall. 385 After factoring out
alcohol-related homicides from this figure, it is doubtful whether illicit
drug use, by itself, contributes significantly to the homicide rate.386
These data, of course, do not explain what circumstances would support
a police officer's fear of violence to the degree that would justify imme-
diate action, such as that which Officer Rose undertook in Dickerson.
The Illinois Supreme Court recently addressed this question in the
context of deciding whether the police were justified in dispensing with
the "knock-and-announce rule" 387 when they executed a search warrant
381. Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 106 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting United States
v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 62 (2d Cir. 1977)).
382. Goldstein et al., supra note 344, at 473.
383. Id. These so-called "economic-compulsive" homicides accounted for only 4% of all drug-
related homicides committed in New York City in 1988. Id. at 466. For an definition of "economic-
compulsive" violence and drug-related homicides, see supra note 376.
384. Goldstein supra note 344, at 467-68. This statistic is for drug-related homicides committed
in New York City in 1988. Alcohol contributed to 95% of psychopharmacological homicides
committed in New York State outside New York City in 1984. Id. at 468. For a general discussion of
drug-related homicides in New York and psychopharmacological homicides, see supra note 376.
385. Goldstein et al., supra note 344, at 466.
386. See id. at 473-74. "The ... data indicate that homicides do occur as a result of perpetrator
and/or victim inebriation. But generally these cases involve people under the influence of alcohol, a
legally obtainable substance" (emphasis added).
387. Justice Cunningham, writing for the Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Condon, 592 N.E.2d
951 (I. 1992), gave an excellent concise summary of the knock-and-announce rule, which I have
adopted to provide background for the limited purpose of this discussion:
The purpose of the knock-and-announce rule is to notify the person inside of the
presence of police and of the impending intrusion, give that person time to respond, avoid
violence, and protect privacy as much as possible. Officers may be excused from the
knock-and-announce requirement if exigent circumstances exist sufficient to justify the
intrusion. Where exigent circumstances exist, the failure of the police to knock and
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for drugs and weapons at the residence of a suspected drug dealer in
People v. Condon.388 In Condon, twelve police officers executed a
search warrant at the residence of defendant Timothy Condon by
breaking through his front door with a battering ram. 389 The state
argued that exigent circumstances justified the officers' conduct in not
warning the occupants of their presence and purpose prior to taking this
action. 390 These alleged exigencies included reliable information that
the residence contained an electronic advance warning system consisting
of two closed-circuit television cameras and a police scanner, and that the
defendant possessed weapons to protect drugs and currency. 391 In
addition, the police had previously arrested the defendant's brother, who
owned the house, for possession of a large quantity of cocaine and a
loaded pistol. 392 The ensuing search confirmed the information. The
police recovered a total of thirteen guns, including ten shotguns, one
rifle, a loaded revolver in the defendant's bedroom, and a loaded pistol in
the defendant's "office." 393
The state urged that the above factors, when viewed concurrently,
supported a reasonable fear of danger to dispense with the knock-and-
announce rule.394 The court disagreed, 395 emphasizing that "nothing in
the warrant or the record . . . [indicated] that these were exceptionally
announce their authority and purpose in the execution of a search warrant for narcotics
does not violate the fourth amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Exigent circumstances may encompass such considerations as danger to the police
officers executing the warrant, or the uselessness of the announcement, or the ease with
which the evidence may be destroyed.
592 N.E.2d at 954-55 (citations omitted).
388. 592 N.E. 2d 951 (I11. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1359 (1993).
389. 592 N.E.2d at 954.
390. Id.
391. Id. at 953.
392. Id.
393. Id. at 954. The police also recovered cocaine, marijuana, and currency. Id.
394. Another factor included in the state's argument for exigent circumstances was the potential
destruction of the cocaine. 592 N.E.2d at 955. When viewed together with the perceived danger, the
state argued that sufficient exigent circumstances existed to dispense with the knock-and-announce
rule. Id.
395. Condon, 592 N.E.2d at 957. The court also found no basis for the state's argument that the
officers feared the potential destruction of evidence. Id. The Court, therefore, found all
circumstances listed by the state insufficient to constitute exigent circumstances, reasoning that
"[w]hile there is a certain appeal to the State's argument, we cannot agree that just because there are
a number of circumstances, not one of which standing alone would create an exigency, the sheer
volume of circumstances without something more is sufficient to create exigent circumstances." Id. at
955.
For contrary views, see, e.g., United States v. Keene, 915 F.2d 1164, 1168-69 (8th Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, Ill S. Ct. 1001 (1991) (finding that state agents were justified in dispensing with the
knock-and-announce rule because the suspects could easily have destroyed the illicit narcotics that
were in liquid form); State v. Matos, 605 A.2d 223, 224 (N.H. 1992) (finding that exigent
circumstances existed to dispense with the notice requirement because the suspects could have easily
destroyed cocaine packaged in small "street quantities"). See also Illinois v. Condon, 113 S. Ct. 1359
(1993) (mem.) (White, J., dissenting), denying cert. in People v. Condon, 592 N.E.2d 951 (Ill. 1992).
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violent people." 396  Although the officers were aware that the
defendant's brother had weapons and drug charges pending against him,
the court concluded that the search warrant evidenced no fear that the
brother posed any danger to them. 397 "[T]here is nothing in the record
to suggest that Bernard Condon had ever been violent or used the gun or
even threatened to use it,"398 wrote Justice Cunningham. "Only if the
officers feared that Bernard Condon would use a gun against them were
they justified in dispensing with the knock-and-announce require-
ment." 399 Second, Justice Cunningham distinguished the state's reliance
upon People v. Trask,400 where the court had said, "The police should
not have to be certain that they will be shot at if they wait very long
before entering; they just have to have a reasonable apprehension of
danger." 401 "The key words," Justice Cunningham emphasized, "are
'wait very long.' The police here did not knock or wait at all-they just
barged in." 402 The court also found the presence of weapons in the
house insufficient to justify an apprehension of danger. "[T]he exis-
tence of a weapon should excuse the knock-and-announce rule only
where the officers reasonably believe the weapon will be used against
them if they proceed with ordinary announcements." 403 Finally, the
court dismissed the notion that an advance warning system posed any
danger to the officers. "[E]ven if the occupants of the house had been
aware of the police approaching via the surveillance cameras or the
police scanner, it does not necessarily follow that they would have 'gone
for their guns."' 404
The officers' hasty action in Condon-barging into the suspects'
house without first knocking and announcing their presence-is analo-
gous to the officers' conduct in Dickerson. In Dickerson, neither officer
attempted to question Dickerson before frisking him. The only verbal
communication between the officers and Dickerson prior to the frisk
occurred when Rose commanded Dickerson to place his hands on the
squad car.405 This behavior contrasts with police conduct in other
396. Condon, 592 N.E.2d at 956.
397. Id. at 955.
398. Id.
399. Id. Cf. State v. Williams, 485 N.W.2d 42, 48 (Wis. 1992) (finding that officer was justified
in dispensing with the knock-and-announce requirement where he believed the suspect possessed both
drugs and a firearm, and where the suspect had previously represented that he would use the firearm
to defend himself).
400. 521 N.E.2d 1222 (111. 1988).
401. Id. at 1230 (quoted in Condon, 592 N.E.2d at 955).
402. 592 NE.2d at 955.
403. Id. at 956 (relying on People v. Ouellette, 401 N.E. 2d 507 (UI. 1979)).
404. Id.
405. Transcript at 17, 25, Dickerson (No. 89067687). During his testimony, Officer Rose
indicated no oral communication other than his command for Dickerson to place his hands on the
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landmark cases. In Terry, Officer McFadden frisked the suspects only
after they had evasively responded to his inquiries. 406 In Adams v.
Williams ,407 the investigating officer seized a gun from the suspect's belt
only after the suspect disobeyed the officer's command to step out of the
car.408 In Michigan v. Long ,409 the police frisked an intoxicated suspect
and searched his car only after they noticed a large hunting knife on the
floorboard of the driver's side of his car.410 (The suspect had also failed
to respond to the officers' request for his registration.) 411 In Dickerson,
the suspect engaged in no such evasive, unresponsive, or threatening
conduct when the officers confronted him. He continued walking
toward the squad car when it entered the alley, and he fully cooperated
with Officer Rose's commands. 412 As in Condon, nothing in the record
indicates that Dickerson was a violent person, or that the police had
reason to believe he was. Under these circumstances, it is difficult to
understand how the two police officers could have feared that Dickerson
was "armed and presently dangerous" to them, or to anyone else. The
only explanation that Officer Rose offered to justify the frisk "for
weapons and contraband" 4 13 was a vague generalization that the police
had found numerous weapons in the area.4 14 Nothing in the record
indicates what crime the officers suspected Dickerson of committing.415
Officer Johnson's police report merely stated that, upon observing
squad car. Id. Dickerson's testimony provided the only hint that there may have been any other
communication:
As I was coming up on the car, the police officers got out of their car and they said, "I
hope you wasn't coming out of this crack house," and I said, "Excuse me," you know,
because I didn't hear them at first and then he said, "I hope you wasn't coming out of this
crack house," so I didn't say nothing after that, you know. So then he told me to put my
hands on the car so I put my hands on the car.
Id. at 30.
406. 392 U.S. at 6-7.
407. 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
408. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143,14445 (1972).
409. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
410. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1036 (1983).
411. Id.
412. Transcript at 16-17, Dickerson (No. 89067687). See State v. Broadnax, 654 P.2d 96, 98-99
(Wash. 1982) (involving a police entry into the home of a suspected drug dealer and the execution of
a search warrant for narcotics). Upon entering the premises, the police ordered two male suspects to
place their hands on their heads while one officer searched the house. Id. Shortly thereafter, a third
detective arrived and frisked the two suspects as they stood with their hands atop their heads. Id. The
frisk revealed narcotics in the clothing of the Petitioner, Arthur Thompson, who was not named in the
warrant. Id. Citing Thompson's cooperation with the police and the officers' failure to indicate a
reasonable belief that the petitioner was armed or presently dangerous, the court held that the facts did
not support a frisk. Id. at 105. "Petitioner's 'mere presence' at a private residence being searched
pursuant to a search warrant cannot justify a frisk of petitioner's person .... " Id. at 101.
413. Transcript at 9. Dickerson (No. 89067687).
414. Id.
415. In contrast, Officer McFadden testified in Terry that his numerous years of experience had
enabled him to diagnose the suspects' behavior as that commonly associated with "casing. .. a stick-
up." Terry, 392 U.S. at 6.
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Dickerson walk into the alley, Johnson told Rose "I want[] to stop this
party."416
At best, the record indicates that the officers suspected Dickerson of
possessing narcotics-the very sort of suspicion held insufficient to
support a frisk in Sibron. Justice Tomljanovich arrived at the same
conclusion when she remarked that Officer Rose "continued feeling the
defendant's person until he found what he was looking for all along." 417
The trial court order, moreover, underscored the trivial nature of Mr.
Dickerson's offense, permitting him to truthfully claim that he had never
been convicted of a crime once he had fulfilled the conditions of his
probation. 418 Chief Justice Warren's analysis in Sibron readily applies to
the Dickerson scenario: "[tihe suspect's mere act of [abruptly changing
direction] ... no more gives rise to reasonable fear of life or limb on the
part of the police officer than it justifies an arrest for committing a
crime." 419 Given Dickerson's subsequent behavior in continuing to walk
toward the squad car and obeying the officer's commands without any
sort of evasive conduct, "one important factor, missing here," as Justice
Harlan commented, was "any need for [the] immediate action"4 20 that
Officer Rose undertook without first questioning Dickerson.
Ybarra v. Illinois421 is also instructive. In Ybarra, police officers
obtained a warrant to search the premises of a bar and the bartender for
evidence of narcotics dealing 422 When the officers executed the search
warrant, they also pat-frisked the patrons of the bar, and discovered
narcotics concealed within a cigarette package belonging to one patron,
Ventura Ybarra. 423 Justice Rehnquist, dissenting, would have upheld the
search and the seizure. 424 The warrant had thrust the officers into a
situation where they confronted approximately one dozen people in a
dimly-lit bar suspected of being a center for narcotics trafficking. 425
The patrons' presence in this suspicious location, he argued, supported a
reasonable assumption that they may also be drug dealers.426 Given the
violent nature of drug trafficking, this suspicion likewise justified a fear
that the patrons may be armed and dangerous.427
416. Transcript at 25, Dickerson (No. 89067687).
417. Dickerson 11, 481 N.W.2d at 846.
418. Transcript at 68, Dickerson (No. 89067687). See also MINN. STAT. ANN. § 152.18 subd. 1
(West 1989).
419. Sibron, 392 U.S. at 64.
420. Id. at 73 (Harlan, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
421.444 U.S. 85 (1979).
422. Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 87-88 (1979).
.423. Id. at 88-89.
424. Id. at 110.
425. Id. at 106.
426. Id.
427. Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 106. See also supra note 381 and accompanying text.
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The Court, in an opinion by Justice Stewart, disagreed and held the
pat-frisk of Ybarra violated Terry's requirement that the police officers
must fear that the individual is armed and dangerous before conducting
a frisk.
Upon seeing Ybarra, they neither recognized him as a person
with a criminal history nor had any particular reason to believe
that he might be inclined to assault them. Moreover, as Police
Agent Johnson later testified, Ybarra, whose hands were empty,
gave no indication of possessing a weapon, made no gestures
or other actions indicative of an intent to commit an assault,
and acted generally in a manner that was not threatening. At
the suppression hearing, the most Agent Johnson could point
to was that Ybarra was wearing a 3/4-length lumber jacket,
clothing which the State admits could be expected on almost
any tavern patron in Illinois in early March. In short, the State
is unable to articulate any specific fact that would have justified
a police officer at the scene in even suspecting that Ybarra was
armed and dangerous. 428
Justice Stewart further commented that Ybarra's mere presence on
premises where agents were executing a warrant to search for evidence of
narcotics dealing was insufficient to support a reasonable suspicion
directed at him.429
In Dickerson, Officers Rose and Johnson neither recognized
Dickerson as a person with a criminal history "nor had any particular
reason to believe that he might be inclined to assault them."430 He
"gave no indication of possessing a weapon, made no gestures or other
actions indicative of an intent to commit an assault, and acted generally
in a manner that was not threatening."431 Finally, the fact that the police
had previously found "numerous weapons" 432 in the area where they
stopped Dickerson provided no further justification for frisking him.
An individual's mere presence in a "bad" neighborhood no more
supports a suspicion that he is an armed and dangerous criminal than did
Sibron's eight hours' of conversation with known narcotics addicts,
Brown's presence in an alley known for narcotics trafficking, or Ybarra's
presence in a bar where police suspected narcotics dealing. As Justice
Stewart commented in Ybarra, Officer Rose pointed to no "specific fact
428. 444 U.S. at 93.
429. Id. at 91 (relying on Sibron, 392 U.S. at 62-63). See also supra note 412 (discussing State v.
Broadnax, 654 P.2d 96, 101, 104 (Wash. 1982)).
430. Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 93.
431. Id.
432. Transcript at 9, Dickerson (No. 89067687).
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that would have justified a police officer at the scene in even suspecting
that [Dickerson] was armed and dangerous." 433
Although he concurred in Minnesota v. Dickerson, Justice Scalia
wrote separately to express his skepticism about whether "the physical
search-the 'frisk'-that produced the evidence at issue here complied
with" the Fourth Amendment's guarantee against unreasonable searches
and seizures. 434 Justice Scalia also questioned the constitutionality of
Terry frisks in general. "I frankly doubt," he wrote, "whether the
fiercely proud men who adopted our Fourth Amendment would have
allowed themselves to be subjected, on mere suspicion of being armed
and dangerous, to such indignity." 435 The Dickerson trial court record
confirms that Officers Rose and Johnson did not comply with even this
low standard when they stopped Timothy Dickerson and immediately
frisked him.
V. CONCLUSION
The plain-touch doctrine applies the plain-view doctrine to an
officer's tactile observations. Thus, in order to seize an incriminating
object under the plain-touch doctrine, an officer must satisfy three
criteria. First, the officer must lawfully be in a position to feel an object
concealed within an outer covering. The situation that will most often
place officers lawfully in a position to make such tactile observations will
be the weapons frisk, although plain-touch can arise in other situations as
well. Second, the object's incriminating nature must be immediately
apparent, giving the officer probable cause to believe that it is contra-
band or evidence of a crime. The officer's examination of the object is
"a truly cursory inspection-one that involves" 436 momentary contact
with the object, without manipulating it in any way. Third, if the officer
immediately recognizes the object as contraband or evidence of a crime,
he must have a lawful right of access to the object before seizing it. At
the moment the officer develops probable cause to suspect that the
object is incriminating evidence, he has grounds to apply for a search
warrant. Absent a search warrant, the officer may not take further
intrusive action to seize the object unless an exception to the Warrant
Requirement applies that would give him a lawful right of access to the
object. In the case of an officer's plain touch during a weapons frisk, the
433. Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 95.
434. Dickerson II1, 113 S. Ct. at 2141 (Scalia, J., concurring).
435. 113 S. Ct. at 2140.
436. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 328 (1987).
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exception that will allow the officer to seize the object is the search-
incident-to-arrest exception.
Thus, a police officer must comply with the requirements of an
investigative stop, a weapons frisk, and the plain-touch doctrine in order
to seize a nonthreatening object discovered during a weapons frisk. To
initially detain a suspect, the officer must have a reasonable, articulable
suspicion that the suspect is engaged in criminal activity. The officer
must also reasonably fear that the suspect may be armed and presently
dangerous in order to conduct a weapons frisk. When the officer feels a
nonthreatening object that he immediately recognizes as contraband,
without expanding the scope of the weapons frisk, this sensation raises
his level of suspicion to probable cause to arrest the suspect for commit-
ting a crime. The officer may then arrest the suspect and seize the object
under the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the Warrant Require-
ment.
Before a trial court reaches a plain-touch issue in the context of a
weapons frisk, therefore, it must first determine whether the investigating
officers properly stopped and frisked the suspect. The lower court
opinions in Dickerson suggest that some courts will readily defer to a
police officer's determination of reasonable suspicion and fear of
violence necessary to stop the suspect and frisk him for weapons. It also
seems that some courts will uphold an investigative stop and a weapons
frisk supported by weak justifications. Now that the police may seize
nonthreatening objects discovered during a frisk, what will prevent a
police officer from using a frisk ostensibly for weapons to justify a
search in fact for contraband? What will prevent an officer in the field
from manipulating an object concealed within someone's clothing until
the officer determines that the object is contraband, and then later
testifying that the object's incriminating nature was "immediately
apparent?" Indeed, is it truly possible for an officer to immediately
recognize an object sandwiched between layers of clothing as contra-
band? This question awaits an answer from scientific experts on tactile
perception.
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